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Abstract 
Recent developments on the African continent have indicated the emergence of a comprehensive 
security framework that has been developed to address the many security issues currently 
threatening peace and stability. A central pillar in this new framework has been the prominent role 
played by Regional Economic Communities (RECs) that have increasingly adopted peace and 
security goals as part of their mandate. This has been especially relevant in East Africa, a region 
with several active terrorist groups, which in turn has seen an increased role played by the regions 
two represented RECs. As such, the aim of this study is to gauge whether a security regime in East 
Africa has evolved in response to the regions terrorist threat. In doing so this thesis adopted a 
regime theoretical approach. An multivariant analytical framework, that combines power, interest, 
knowledge and context-based assumptions was employed to unpack the dynamics and 
circumstances that have facilitated and hindered cooperation in the region. By adopting a case 
study methodology that utilized process tracing, this thesis analysed official sources that included 
annual reports, documents, agreements and strategies that have a focus on counter-terrorism and 
are pertinent to the East African region. The results of this study show that the social factors of 
power, interests, knowledge and context have all had a significant influence on the formation of 
institutional arrangements and a comprehensive CT framework in East Africa. Furthermore, this 
study concludes that while a fully-fledged security regime has not formed in East Africa, the 
structure for one is very much in place. As such, the formation of a security regime is still very 
likely, maybe even at a sub-regional level instead.  
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1. Introduction 
Confronting the security issues that have come to define the twenty-first century is a complex and 
multifaceted task. No more so has this issue become a reality than on the African continent, which 
has faced countless eras of fragility and insecurity spanning from early colonial expansion to the 
Cold War politicking of the late twentieth century. More recent developments, driven by the 
Global War on Terror (GWOT), have further complicated security dynamics, as the continent 
continues to function as a host for often competing interests from domestic, regional and 
international actors. Considering this context, generalizing about security issues on the African 
continent can be both difficult and potentially dangerous.1 Despite this, recent developments on 
the continent have indicated the emergence of an African peace and security regime, aimed at 
confronting and remedying the issues threatening stability on the continent. Tacking this change 
is a necessary task, to fully grasp both the complex issues facing the continent, as well as the 
responses and strategies employed to meet them 
 
1.1 Purpose 
Shifting global dynamics have long had far-reaching effects on the Africa continent. This has been 
especially relevant with regard to security issues and how they have been met and addressed. 
Exactly how these dynamics have shaped the continent will be explored in the following section, 
but it can already be stated that the African Union (AU) has institutionalised an increasingly 
security orientated approach over the years. As such, the goal of promoting peace, security and 
stability in Africa has come to represent a central goal of the AU, which has led to the formation 
of an extensive and intricate security framework.  
A significant step in realizing this goal was the drafting of the African Peace and Security 
Architecture (APSA), which serves as the principle framework to promote peace and security 
across the African continent. The formation and promulgation of APSA heralded an important 
step for the AU in establishing itself as an important and outright security actor.2 Furthermore, the 
aim of APSA is to uphold a combination of shared norms and structures that should guide peace 
and security responses on the continent. Here, the adherence to ideals like multilateralism, 
democratic constitutionalism and the inclusivity of all stakeholders in the management and 
resolution of security-related issues, forms the common strategy that the AU has chosen to adopt.3  
                                                 
1 James. J. Hentz, 'Introduction: African security in the twenty-first century ', in J.J. Hentz (ed.), Routledge Handbook of 
African Security, London, Routledge, 2013, p. 3. 
2 Ulf Engel and João Gomes Porto, 'The African Union's New Peace and Security Architecture: Toward an Evolving 
Security Regime?', African Security, vol. 2, no. 2-3, 2009, p. 83. 
3 African Union, About Agenda 2063, https://au.int/agenda2063/about, (accessed May 14). 
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An important feature of the APSA is the eight officially recognised Regional Economic 
Communities (RECs) that not only function in tandem with the AU but are often utilized to pursue 
the security-related aims of the APSA. From this, it can, and has been, argued that the African 
security strategy that has developed, is a result of several different actors that function in 
collaboration with one another, creating a shared understanding of security governance.4 
Considering this, it is no surprise that responding to the current threat posed by jihadist groups 
has become a central task of the AU. While these groups affect continental peace and stability, 
they are generally located and function in regional hotspots. As such the RECs have increasingly 
been used as a tool to operationalize the security aims of the AU in their respective regions. This 
has been evident in East Africa, which is host to several active terrorist organizations. The global 
response towards countering the terrorist threat has reaped mixed results and it has tended to belie 
regional and local expertise. As such, examining regional efforts to the problem could prove 
significant in understanding how the issue is tackled.  
Considering the above, understanding how and why states cooperate and collaborate is an 
integral part of International Relations scholarship. Cooperation on security issues is not a 
common phenomenon. Nevertheless, this has occurred in East Africa, especially in their response 
to terrorist threats. Two RECs have emerged, the East African Community (EAC) and the 
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), with both addressing, among other 
things, security issues in the region as part of their mandate. Fully understanding this process of 
cooperation and the dynamics that underpin it can be both complex and multifaceted. Regime 
theory, however, can prove a useful analytical tool to explain how and why this has occurred. The 
cooperative structures that are currently in place in the region reflect certain tenets of a regime, 
which begs the question of whether such a structure exists. Considering these indications, this 
thesis will aim to test this claim by asking the simple question; how far has a security regime formed in East 
Africa in response to the regions terrorist threat? While this question will form the basis for this paper’s 
academic inquiry, several other questions will, in turn, be addressed, namely;   
-How can this formation be understood?  
-What are the circumstances that led to its formation? 
-What are the main challenges to its formation? 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 Engel and Porto. (2009) 
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1.2 Relevance 
The relatively recent developments within the AU and the promulgation and institutionalisation 
of several security apparatus on the continent has led to an increased academic focus in the field. 
Scholarship on the AU and how it is equipped to deal with contemporary security issues has 
become a vibrant field, that has focused on issues pertaining from security governance to norm 
diffusion.  Nevertheless, the majority of research conducted in this field has tended to be overly 
descriptive, focussing on empirical accounts of the security issues faced by the AU and how APSA 
has been employed to tackle them. However, recent debates have intended to widen this debate 
by considering the nature and dynamics that define security engagement on the continent.  
An increased focus on the institutional development of the African security architecture 
has attempted to unpack the dynamics that have led to today’s framework. In line with this 
reasoning, an early discussion has begun to take hold within the field about the emergence of a 
security regime at the continental level. Engel and Porto have developed this idea by analysing the 
formation of norms, values and social processes that are evident within APSA and how this 
indicates the emergence of a regime.5 Malte Brosig has also addressed this dilemma but has 
distanced himself from the distinction of security regimes, focussing instead on ‘security 
complexes’. In his research, he focusses not on the formation of a single coherent regime, but 
instead on overlapping and intersecting regimes, with the aim of understanding how different 
security regimes are interconnected within the Africa context.6 Despite this wide focus, tentative 
steps have also been taken to analyse the role of RECs within the broader continental security 
framework. Peter Arthur has addressed this issue but has focussed on how RECs have evolved to 
take on a role in conflict resolution with their neighbours. He argues that despite the many 
challenges, the AU has increasingly utilized RECs as intermediaries in conflict situations, as a tool 
to consolidate regional stability but also to reinforce conflict management mechanisms on the 
continent.7 
While the above has described research that has focused on institutionalist understandings, 
cognitivist approaches have also been employed within the field. Central here has been Paul D. 
Williams who has developed the idea of a ‘security culture’ which he has applied to the African 
context. He argues the impact of cultural norms on security dynamics is underdeveloped as 
research has overly relied on neorealist and neoliberal assumptions. As such he endeavours to fill 
                                                 
5 Ibid., p.93. 
6 Malte Brosig, 'Introduction: The African Security Regime Complex—Exploring Converging Actors and Policies', 
African Security, vol. 6, no. 3-4, 2013, p. 172. 
7 Peter Arthur, 'Promoting Security in Africa through Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and the African 
Union’s African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)', Insight on Africa, vol. 9, no. 1, 2017, p. 18. 
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this gap by considering two cases pertinent to the African context; unconstitutional changes of 
governments and humanitarian interventions. Through these examples, Williams highlights that 
the AU has established a unique security culture that has institutionalized specific norms and values 
that have in turn influenced how security challenges are met on the continent.8   
Considering all of the above, this study will build off the current scholarship on the 
emerging security regime in Africa, but instead, limit the scope to a regional focus. By doing so, 
this study will contribute to not only the overall discussion on the emerging African security regime 
but more specifically the role of RECs and how they coordinate to tackle specific security issues. 
Furthermore, this study will also aim to provide useful insights into the East Africa region, which 
has been underdeveloped within scholarship on security governance and cooperation.   
The current literature on regime theory and its application will be developed in section 3 
of this thesis. However, through the application of a regime theoretical approach, this study will 
aim to contribute to the current research on the emerging African security paradigm but go beyond 
the more descriptive and evaluative work and instead focus on an aspect that is relatively under-
researched, namely: understanding the processes that lead to this formation. Previous studies have 
failed to address the underlying analytical questions that underpin security cooperation, regime 
formation and the organizing principles that are central to AUs security architecture. As such, this 
thesis aims to fill in this gap, by focussing on how regional actors cooperate to deal with a specific 
issue and how different social factors have both facilitated and hindered this. 
 
1.3 Thesis Disposition 
This thesis is organized into 6 main sections. Following this introduction, section 2 will highlight 
the global dynamics that have come to shape the AU and how it has evolved into the security 
actor, with the purpose of situating this thesis within a contemporary context. Furthermore, this 
section will also explore how the principle of regionalism has developed in Africa and the role of 
RECs in the overall continental security framework. 
Section 3 will consist of the theoretical framework that will be employed. Here, the central 
tenets of regime theory will be addressed as well as how the concept of regimes has been defined 
and conceptualized. This section will also provide an overview of the realist, liberalist and 
cognitivist strands that encapsulate regime theoretical assumptions. With the theoretical 
framework highlighted, section 4 will introduce the methodological choices that will be utilized in 
the thesis. Here, the merits of a case study and process tracing approach will be discussed, as well 
                                                 
8 Paul D. Williams, 'From Non-Intervention to Non-Indifference: The Origins and Development of the African 
Union's Security Culture', vol. 106, no. 423, 2007, p. 256-266. 
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as how they will be operationalized together with the analytical framework to tackle this studies 
research questions. The application of the theoretical and methodological approaches and the 
analysis of the chosen case will constitute section 5 of this thesis. Here, a regime theoretical analysis 
of the evolving security framework in East Africa will be conducted by applying the two 
frameworks highlighted below (Fig 2 & 3). The final part of this thesis, section 6, will critically 
discuss the findings from the previous section and attempt to address the central questions posed 
in this study. This section will also provide some concluding thoughts and avenues for further 
research within the field of regime formation and the evolving African security framework.  
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2. Background  
In order to situate this study within the necessary context, it can be useful to provide a brief 
historical overview of the significant events that have shaped dynamics in Africa. As such, the 
following sections will aim to highlight the changing security landscape on the African continent 
and the institutions and structures that have evolved out of them. In essence, this section will aim 
to map the emergence of the AU as an outright security actor and the role RECs have come to 
play in the realization of continental security aims.    
 
2.1 Changing Global Order  
As touched upon above, the African continent has been confronted with a myriad of changing 
security dynamics that have been characterised by several global processes.9 Tracking these 
processes could prove helpful in understanding the dynamics that shape contemporary realities on 
the continent today. A cornerstone of Africa studies has been the legacy of colonialism and how 
it has impacted development on the continent. The late nineteenth-century saw a scramble for 
territorial gains on the African continent, which saw arbitrary borders drawn up that cemented 
territorial partitions that are still in place today. While controversial in their own sense, colonial 
powers in Africa rarely engaged militarily with one another and as such security issues stemmed 
primarily from pro-independence/ anti-colonial actors. This same trend was evident in the post-
independent era, with very few interstate conflicts occurring on the African continent. The same 
however cannot be said about intrastate conflicts.10 The post-independence era was rife with 
internal conflicts, that stemmed out of a myriad of overlapping factors.  
Much of the civil unrest in Africa continued and was exacerbated during the superpower 
politicking of the Cold War. The African continent was transformed into a geopolitical chessboard 
where proxy wars defined the security landscape and authoritarian strongmen where backed in an 
attempt to cement ideological authority.11 With both the colonial and superpower control 
extinguished in the post-Cold War era, external factors played a minimal role in the security threats 
faced by African nations. Instead, the removal of the moderating role of external actors ushered 
                                                 
9 Kwesi Aning and Naila  Salihu, 'The African Security Predicament', in J.J. Hentz (ed.), Routledge Handbook of African 
Security, London, Routledge, 2013, p. 10. 
10 Hentz (2013), p. 4. 
11 Crawford Young, 'The Heritage of Colonialism ', in John W. Harbeson and Donald S. Rothchild (eds), Africa in 
world politics: engaging a changing global order, Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 2013, p. 29. 
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in an age of identity politics, where the artificial boundaries drawn up during the colonial era were 
increasingly contested and at times torn up.12  
The post-Cold War era saw a shift in global dynamics, with processes like globalization 
increasingly shaping political, economic and security discourses. While this period saw an increase 
in democratic advancements and ushered in a hope for a new world order, the aftermath of the 
September 11 terrorist attacks halted these ambitions. The GWOT has polarized global discourses 
in a way that is reminiscent of the Cold War ideological divide. Furthermore, it has thrust the 
African continent back into global strategic considerations, transforming the continent, once again, 
into a conduit for external actors to realize their interests through. This is most clearly 
demonstrated by the considerable increase in security-related aid that has been sent to certain 
‘anchor states’ in Africa to bolster regional counter-terrorist (CT) capabilities. It is no surprise 
therefore that the African continent has emerged as a significant setting within the GWOT and 
continues to hold considerable strategic value for many external actors.13 
 
2.2 Emergence as a Security Actor 
These global processes understandably had a significant effect on security dynamics on the 
continent, but they did not occur in a vacuum. Evolving in tandem, and often as a consequence, 
of these global shifts was the formation of an African institution aimed at consolidating the 
political and territorial integrity of African countries. The Organisation of African Unity (OAU)- 
a precursor to the African Union- was established in 1963 with the aim of safeguarding hard fought 
for gains made during the decolonisation process. The Charter of the organization stressed the 
importance of preserving the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the member states and to “fight 
against neo-colonialism in all its forms”.14 While flawed in many ways, the OAU nevertheless 
provided a much-needed platform for African states to engage in political, economic and social 
dialogue and was designed with the goal of promoting peace and security on the continent. 
However, the OAUs steadfast defence of non-interference and state sovereignty, rendered it a 
redundant security actor, when faced with the many internal struggles for power that defined that 
period.15  
 As the Cold War waged on, the OAU was involved in several conflicts, both as 
intermediaries and as outright peacekeepers. Despite these efforts, the OAU was limited by their 
                                                 
12 Francis  Deng, 'Reconciling sovereignty with responsibility', in John W. Harbeson and Donald S. Rothchild (eds), 
African in World Politics Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 2013, p. 326. 
13 Ibid., pp.33-35. 
14 OAU (1963), Charter of the Organization of African Unity  
15 Jonathan D. Rechner, 'From the OAU to the AU: A Normative Shift with Implications for Peacekeeping and 
Conflict Management, or Just a Name Change?', Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, vol. 39, no. 2, 2006, p. 544. 
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lack of logistical and financial resources which rendered many of their interventions ineffective. 
By rigorously enforcing the principle of non-interference, the OAU was reluctant to intervene in 
internal disputes, which aided in consolidating the power of several authoritarian regimes on the 
continent.16 The ending of the Cold War saw the introduction of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, 
Management and Resolution (MCPMR) which aimed to respond to the many shortcomings of the 
organisation's security capabilities. This new approach adopted a more interventionist stance, as 
the mechanism gave the OAU the power to deploy military missions in response to the security 
challenges in the post-Cold War era. Despite this, the power to intervene was still restricted and 
the mechanism functioned primarily as a tool to prevent conflicts rather than manage or resolve 
them.17 
 Considering these shortcomings, a growing consensus for the need for stronger 
institutions began to take hold on the continent. African leaders began discussing the possibilities 
of a total reformation of the OAU, to make it more effective at addressing peace and security 
issues. While the OAU was relatively successful in its initial goal of safeguarding the gains made 
during decolonization, it was not equally adequate in dealing with the other issues on the continent. 
As such the AU was established on July 11, 2000 and was designed to address many of the 
shortcomings of the OAU. A central goal of this new organization was to “promote peace, 
security, and stability on the continent”18 The transformation of the OAU embodied, among other 
things, a broader shift of the scope and capacities of existing security institutions. To achieve this 
the AU adopted the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African 
Union, which provided the basis for the new institutions and decision-making procedures that 
underpin the organisation’s peace and security strategy. Central here was the establishment of 
‘pillars’ that include: the Peace and Security Council (PSC); the Panel of the Wise; the Continental 
Early Warning System (CEWS); the African Standby Force (ASF) and the Peace Fund.19 Further 
institutional change took place with the drafting of APSA which has functioned as a 
comprehensive guide and framework for governing bodies on the continent to address and 
respond to pertinent security threats. This new approach also brought with it a stronger inclination 
towards the principle of regionalism. 
  
 
 
                                                 
16 Ibid., pp.553-554. 
17 Ibid., p.555. 
18 OAU (2000), Constitutive Act of the African Union,  
19 African Union (2002), Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union,  
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2.3 Regionalism in Africa 
Regional engagement on issues such as the rule of law, good governance and of course security 
did not come into the fray until the early 1990s. The initial mandate of these communities focussed 
primarily on economic integration, hence the ‘economic’ designation in RECs. This goal was not 
borne out of superfluous circumstances but was a product of the dependent nature of relations 
between the global South and global North at that time.20 It was however after the adoption of the 
Abuja Plan of Action during the 1990s, that a continental blueprint for the creation of RECs was 
put in place, establishing regional groupings that would function as building blocks for an 
integrated African continent.21 Today there are eight officially recognized RECs on the African 
continent; the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU); the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC), the IGAD, the Community of Sahel-Saharan States 
(CENSAD), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), and the EAC.22 
Considering that this thesis will focus on the two RECs operating in East Africa, it is necessary to 
define their membership. The EAC consists of six countries; Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, South 
Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda, while IGAD has a slightly larger scope with eight members 
consisting of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan and Uganda. 
 Emphasis on increased regionalism was further supported by the launch of the AU in the 
early 2000s. As noted previously, the transformation of the continental organ brought with it new 
considerations on peace, security and defence. In the era of globalization, however, regional 
integration has become an imperative for the AU, not only regarding maintaining global 
competitiveness in global trading, but also in addressing conflict prevention strategies. It is the aim 
of the AU, together with the RECs, to realize these new goals by bolstering the capacity of regional 
institutions, a feat that has increasingly been internalized by RECs on the continent.23  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
20 Daniel. C Bach, 'Regionalism in Africa', in J.J. Hentz (ed.), Routledge Handbook of African Security, London, Routlage, 
2013, p. 181. 
21 Ibid., p.185. 
22 African Union, Regional Economic Communities (RECs), https://au.int/en/organs/recs, (accessed 26 March ). 
23 Aning and Salihu (2013), p. 17. 
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3. Theoretical Framework 
Understanding the rules and procedures that govern state behaviour has long been a cornerstone 
of International Relations (IR) scholarship. Dominant conceptions of international order tended 
to overly rely on realist assumptions of a zero-sum state of anarchy, which proved inadequate in 
explaining the growing trend of interdependence experienced after the Second World War.24 Borne 
out of dissatisfaction with this limited approach, regime theory has, since the mid-1970s, attempted 
to clarify this dilemma by addressing how and why cooperation between sovereign-nation states 
can be sustained in a divided world order. Furthermore, regime analysis aims to tackle the puzzle 
of international institution-building in a world of sovereign states by highlighting the conditions 
and mechanisms that permit such processes. In turn, this approach theorizes the formation, 
trajectory and lifespan of international regimes, in order to not only highlight their role in the 
international system but also how they influence and are in turn influenced, by the actors that exist 
and function in this same system.  
The study of international regimes has therefore evolved into a detailed and rich field, 
encompassing not only the study of international politics but aspects of international political 
economy and environmental governance as well.25 Consequently, in today’s increasingly globalised 
world, there is no area of international discourse that is devoid of some form of regime formation, 
as regime structures have firmly embedded themselves in the contemporary global order.26 The 
following section will aim to conceptualize the meaning of regimes as well outline the central tenets 
of regime theory. Following this, a theoretical framework will be presented, based on regime 
theory, which will serve as the analytical foundation of this thesis and will as such be employed in 
the analysis section of this thesis.  
 
3.1 Regime Theory  
Understanding state behaviour as rule-governed activity predates the emergence of the modern 
state. Nevertheless, it was first during the twentieth century that the concept of regime formation 
became a global phenomenon. As highlighted above, the globalization process has altered 
conceptions of global order and in turn how nation-states relate and interact with each other. Key 
here has been the nation-states immersion into increasingly complex institutions, rules and 
procedures that have regulated behaviour and as such international relations as a whole.27 
                                                 
24 V. Rittberger and P. Mayer, (eds), Regime theory and international relations, Clarendon Press, 1993. p. xii. 
25 Ibid., p. xiii.  
26Richard Little, 'International regimes', in John Baylis, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owens (eds), The globalization of world 
politics: an introduction to international relations, 5th ed edn, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014, p. 290.  
27 Ibid. 
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Notwithstanding this gradual shift in global order, it was first in the 1970s that IR scholars began 
to truly explore and theorize the rationale behind interstate cooperation and collective responses 
to issues at the global level.28   
 Despite consensus over the importance of regimes within IR, the initial formation of a 
theoretical base left many scholars divided, specifically on exactly how and why regimes are formed 
and the consequences their formation would have on state behaviour. Three distinct schools of 
thought have emerged as essential components of regime theory. The (neo)realist, (neo)liberal and 
cognitivist approaches have come to inform much of the debate surrounding the formation, nature 
and consequences of international regimes.29 However, it should be considered that while these 
three strands share the common understanding that regimes have a role on the international stage 
and do impact world politics, they differ markedly on the degree of this impact and what accounts 
for it. Central to this distinction is the assumptions each approach makes about the nature and 
motivations of state-actors.30   
 
3.1.1 Realist Approach 
The realist account within regime theory structures its principal arguments around the issue of 
power, but more specifically the power capabilities of states in an international system. As with 
most realist approaches, there is a general scepticism about the prospects for inter-state 
cooperation in an anarchic international environment. Nevertheless, within the study of regimes, 
the power-based approach does acknowledge that regime-based inter-state cooperation is both a 
possibility and reality.31 While this may seem contrary to the basic assumptions of realist thought, 
neo-realists argue that the formation of regimes are a means to end too, with the absolute end 
being survival. The lack of a central agency in an anarchic system ensures that self-help is the order 
of the day.32 Therefore, the pursuit of absolute gains governs the behaviour of states in this system, 
as states seek to defend their own interests. This is where the factor of power is especially 
important.  
Neo-realists argue that collective behaviour is shaped by the strongest country and as such 
regime formation will only emerge when a “systemic concentration of material power resources 
                                                 
28 Volker. Rittberger, ''Research on International Regimes in Germany'', in V. Rittberger and P. Mayer (eds), Regime 
theory and international relations, Clarendon Press, 1993. p. 11. 
29 A. Hasenclever, P. Mayer, and V. Rittberger, (eds), Theories of International Regimes, Cambridge University Press, 1997. 
p. 1-2 
30 Ibid. p. 2-3.  
31 Little (2014), p. 290.  
32 Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger (1997), p. 115. 
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exist”.33 Simply put, this thesis posits that regimes are created and maintained by the strongest 
party (or hegemon) which in turn compels other countries to join and comply. In this case, states 
that cooperate are doing so based on the interests of the dominant country and as such the 
formation of regimes is seen as a means to promote the interests of particular actors. In this line 
of thought, a diffusion of international power will undermine a regime and if a hegemons control 
over tangible resources declines a regime will eventually collapse.34  So in essence, inter-state 
cooperation is more accurately considered inter-state coordination which is facilitated or enabled 
by regimes. This power-based approach argues that regime formation reflects power distribution 
in the international system and are as such merely conduits for hegemons to extend their influence.  
 
3.1.2 Liberal Approach 
While realist approaches to regime theory focus predominantly on power, liberal accounts tend to 
instead favour an interest-based line of reasoning. Neo-liberal or interest-based theories have been 
exceedingly influential in the analysis of international institutions and as such regime formation at 
the global level. Despite borrowing heavily from essential realist assumptions, the neo-liberal 
approach diverges in its institutionalist perspective, namely its portrayal of regimes as both 
effective and resilient.35 Nevertheless, the neo-liberal stance mirrors neo-realism in several ways. 
Both approaches acknowledge that states are the unitary actor in global politics and that their 
behaviour is shaped by the anarchic nature of the international system. Furthermore, both stances 
agree that states are rational actors and are as such driven by self-interest with the goal of 
maximizing positive outcomes.36  
Despite these shared understandings, neo-liberalism was developed in response to the 
perceived shortcomings of the neo-realist stance. Central here was providing a better explanation 
to the sustained influence of certain international institutions, that were able to persist despite 
redistributions of global power. Unlike the power-based approach, neo-liberalism argues that 
cooperation is very much a possibility in a state of anarchy, even without a hegemon.37 The state 
of anarchy inhibits inter-state cooperation, which can be overcome through the formation of 
regimes. Here, the factor of interests is especially relevant. Robert Keohane has been a key 
supporter of this stance, with his contractualist (or functionalist) theory, forming what has become 
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synonymous with the study of international regimes. Keohane borrows from microeconomic 
theories to reason that while all states are driven by self-interest, they will sometimes sacrifice some 
autonomy to establish regimes where the gains of cooperation exceed the gains from unilateral 
action. Simply put, and in contrast to realist assumptions, rational self-interested actors can still be 
incentivised to form international regimes.38  
In the anarchic system that is characteristic of both the realist and liberal worldview, the 
ability for states to make agreements is hindered by uncertainties, mistrust and informational 
asymmetries. In such a system, it is unlikely that international collaboration will take place, which 
is why regimes arise to resolve these same problems.39 This is achieved in three ways. Firstly, 
regimes reduce uncertainties, simply by providing states with information through monitoring 
arrangements. With this, the fear of ‘defection’ is reduced, as the probability of being ‘caught 
cheating is increased, which in turn decreases the overall risk to cooperate. Secondly, regimes also 
reduce transaction costs by institutionalizing cooperation which makes it cheaper to negotiate and 
enforce agreements. Regimes also link clusters of issues to one another, allowing for more 
streamlined strategies, while also making future cooperation more likely.40 Thirdly, regimes 
influence state behaviour by changing beliefs, perceptions and expectations of each other’s 
behaviour. By providing standards for behaviour through clear rules and procedures, regimes are 
able to define the appropriate action that is founded on the principle of reciprocity. As such, 
regimes are able to coordinate the interests of states to achieve mutually beneficial gains. All in all, 
neoliberalism navigates the obstacles highlighted by realist thought, by considering regimes as 
conduits, through which mutual interests can be realized through cooperation. 
 
3.1.3 Cognitivist Approach 
While the realist, and even more so, neo-liberalist schools of thought have dominated the study of 
international regimes since the fields conception, a third approach has developed to remedy 
perceived shortcomings of the aforementioned stances. The cognitivist point of view takes issue 
with several basic assumptions developed by neo-realists and adopted by the neoliberal approach. 
Firstly, is the notion that states are rational actors with pre-imposed exogenously given identities, 
powers and interests. Secondly is the limited static approach to the study of international relations, 
which disregards notions of learning and history. Thirdly and finally is the predisposition towards 
a positivist methodology that renders comprehension of factors like social norms almost 
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impossible.41 As such, the cognitivist point of view accepts the relevance of interests and how they 
shape state behaviour but go further in that they focus on the origin of these interests and how or 
why preferences form.  
While the neo-realist and neo-liberal stances favour power and interest-based approaches 
respectively, the cognitivist point of view considers knowledge and ideas as explanatory factors in 
regime formation. The cognitivist stance argues that state behaviour can be better understood by 
considering the normative beliefs that underpin the decision-making process. By focussing on this 
aspect and how knowledge is distributed, a better understanding of identities and preferences can 
be cultivated which in turn could shed light on state behaviour and as such regime formation.42 
The cognitivist stance has two dominant strands that differ primarily in its critique of the rationalist 
nature of neo-realism and liberalism. This division is characterized by those that subscribe to a 
weak form of cognitivism and those that subscribe to a strong one.  
Proponents of the weak cognitivist strand do not reject the interest-based approach, per 
se, but they do argue that it is somewhat incomplete. Weak cognitivists consider how actors 
perceive international problems and how these perceptions can lead to regime formation. As such, 
the focus is placed on actors’ casual and normative beliefs, which, weak cognitivists argue, must 
be considered independently of material factors (i.e. the distribution of wealth and power).43 Weak 
cognitivists make three central assumptions. Firstly, they do not consider interests as exogenously 
given, but instead a consequence of a body of knowledge That shapes the perceptions of states 
and informs “decisionmakers about linkages between causes and effects and, thus, between means 
and ends”.44 With this, weak cognitivists argue that actor preferences in global politics are 
contingent on the knowledge they carry and how they understand the world. Secondly, because of 
the increasingly technical nature of international issues, decision-makers are often faced with 
uncertainties about their interests and how to realize them. As such, weak cognitivists argue that 
for actors to make informed and intelligent decisions, a ready supply of high-quality information 
must be made available. Agents providing this expert advice are therefore able to exert 
considerable influence on the decisions made by policymakers. Finally, an important aspect of 
regime formation is that a shared understanding of the problem at hand exists between the relevant 
actors Here, a consensus or minimum collective understanding must be reached about the scope 
and nature of the problem if any form of cooperation is to take place.   
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Moving on, while weak cognitivists argue for a broadening of the rationalist stance, strong 
cognitivists claim that a rationalist perspective is altogether inadequate in explaining regime 
formation. As Strong cognitivists reject the rationalist ontology that is shared by the power and 
interest-based frameworks. Considering this and considering that this study will utilize a 
multivariant model that combines the previously named approaches, the strong cognitivist stance 
will not be considered here. This is because the strong cognitivist stance cannot be integrated with 
realist and liberal accounts due to their different ontological and epistemological positions. 
The above section has provided an overview of the three main theoretical approaches that 
have come to underpin the study of regimes (summarized in Figure 1). While they provide insights 
into the nature of regime formation and the processes that determine their survival, they do not 
tackle the issue of clarifying the concept of regimes as a whole. As such, the following section will 
aim to conceptualize the concept, by outlining the definitional reflections that have been employed. 
With that done, I will then highlight a theoretical framework that will function as an analytical tool 
in this thesis.   
 
Figure 1: Main theories in the study of international regimes 
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3.2 Conceptualizing Regimes 
The study of regimes and the formation of the fields theoretical underpinnings evolved during the 
1970s and has since become a source of inspiration for those interested in understanding the 
dynamics informing international cooperation. Before its conception, dominant approaches to the 
study of international organizations tended to be overly formalistic, focussing primarily on formal 
organizations while disregarding the societal shifts and growing interdependence that defined that 
period.45 Regime theory attempted to fill this gap, by studying how norm-driven behaviour governs 
state interaction and as such the formation of international institutions and regimes in a seemingly 
anarchic environment. Several points can be made about the significance of the theory, its 
applications and how the field has grown and evolved over the years.  
 
3.2.1 Defining the Concept  
Like many other concepts in IR scholarship, ‘regimes’ have come to encapsulate a myriad of 
different meanings and denotations. At its conception, regime theory was faced with a volley of 
criticism, with detractors like Susan Strange vocal with their scepticism of what they saw as an ill-
defined and unclear field of research. Strange argued that the study of regimes was doomed to fail 
due to the ‘imprecision’ and ‘woolliness’ of the regime concept.46 These criticisms did not fall on 
deaf ears, as scholars within the field have made several attempts to clarify and modify a definition 
that is not only consensual but represents the central tenets of regime theory. Before turning to 
the definitions that are commonly accepted within regime analysis, it is important to clarify two 
points. Firstly, international regimes are institutions and should, therefore, be treated, considered 
and studied as such. Secondly, international organizations are not synonymous with international 
regimes, as the former’s scope is not restricted to a specific issue area, while the latter are issue-
specific institutions by definition.47  
When the concept of international regimes was first introduced in 1975 by John Ruggie, 
the working definition that was presented saw regimes as “a set of mutual expectations, rules and 
regulations, plans, organizational energies and financial commitments, which have been accepted 
by a group of states”.48 While this definition provided a useful starting point for analysis, its rather 
limited and vague nature highlighted the imprecision that was at the heart of Susan Strange’s 
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criticism. Therefore, a definition was later elaborated by Stephan Krasner and has become the 
most influential and widely accepted definition of regimes within the field. Krasner considers 
international regimes as; 
 
“implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around 
which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations. Principles 
are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behaviour defined 
in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for 
action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making and 
implementing collective choice”.49 
 
From these two definitions, it can be established that the common denominator of all international 
regimes is a degree of convergent expectations and a determined pattern of behaviour or practice. 
This definition is also in line with the sociological reasoning that underpins our understanding of 
institutions, which are seen as “persistent and connected sets of rules (formal and informal) that 
prescribe behavioural roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations”.50 Despite the development 
of these definitions, there is still a degree of dissent within the field of regime theory about what 
should constitute a regime. Nevertheless, the stated definition is the most commonly cited example 
and the definition that has come to represent analyses of regime formation. In sum, despite 
disagreement, there are several defining elements that are at the heart of understanding regimes. 
Firstly, there must exist an interrelated collection of principles, norms, rules and decision-making 
procedures. Secondly, this collection acts as a guide for behaviour for all states involved, 
determining expectations and reducing uncertainties. Finally, a regime must have an issue-specific 
focus, where the collection can be engaged and realized.    
 
3.2.2 Significance of Regimes 
With this definition in mind, another question can be tackled, namely; why do regimes matter?. 
Academics in this field, when addressing this question have looked at the often-underestimated 
influence that regimes have in governing state behaviour. Moving beyond understandings that see 
regimes as merely static summaries of rules and norms, academics have argued that regimes can 
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function as important agents, influencing behaviour through the development of coordinated and 
convergent policymaking that can facilitate reshuffles of power in a given area.51  
Regimes have also shown to be conduits where cooperation and coordination can occur. 
This is made possible by the ability for regimes to reduce uncertainty and insecurity between 
interstate interactions, ultimately supplanting unilateralist motivations. As such regimes are often 
considered a form of regulated conflict management, as they improve the contractual environment, 
stabilizing cooperation and producing information that would otherwise be unavailable.52 As the 
world becomes increasingly interconnected and globalization continues to influence and govern 
global politics, unilateral action in response to specific issues has become increasingly rare. 
Considering this, regime formation has established itself as a capable tool for regulating global 
activity across a wide range of activities.53 
The current scholarship on regime theory has tended to focus on issues associated 
primarily with environmental governance and political economy. As global awareness of the 
damage being done to the environment has increased, so too has the formation of environmental 
regimes.54 Economic regimes, arguably the most firmly entrenched of forms, have also featured 
heavily in the fields scholarship. A variety of economic regimes were established after the Second 
World war to boost economic growth through investments, trade and finance.55 The formation of 
security regimes is a relatively new phenomenon within the field and as such it does not have the 
same empirical depth as the other two forms. Nevertheless, security regimes have previously 
formed around specific issues such as arms control, non-proliferation and drug trafficking.  
 
3.2.3 Regime Theory’s Application 
As the previous section highlighted, single-factor analyses have long been employed to explain and 
understand the regime formation process. Rationalist perspectives and liberal accounts have 
proven useful in highlighting some of the central factors associated with regime formation but are 
nevertheless weakened by their somewhat broad assumptions. As such, a multifaceted approach, 
that also incorporates assumptions highlighted by the cognitivist approach, could prove more 
useful, as it allows for greater specificity and a more contextualized understanding of regime 
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formation.56 Young and Osherenko have developed an analytical framework aimed at 
hypothesizing regime formation. They divide their model into four general explanatory variables 
that are situated within the theoretical underpinnings of regime theory. They include power-based 
explanations, which are based on neo-realist assumptions, interest-based explanations that borrow 
from the neoliberal tradition, knowledge-based explanations that are grounded in cognitivism and 
finally context-based approaches that consider exogenous factors in world politics (Figure 2).57 Each 
factor-based explanation contains hypotheses that are in turn tested to determine the explanatory 
merits of each factor in regime formation. 
The power-based explanation argues that hegemony in the form of either benign hegemony 
or coercive hegemony is necessary for regime formation. However other power-based explanations are 
also offered, in the form of bipolar distribution of power, the degree of symmetry in power distributions and 
the existence of a directorate, as possible explanations for regime formation. The interest-based 
approach contains ten hypotheses that have been created to explain regime formation. They 
include Integrative Bargaining, Equity, Salient Solutions, Exogenous Shocks, Policy Priority, Common Good, 
Science and Technology, Relevant Parties, Compliance Mechanisms and Individuals as Leaders. With regards 
the knowledge-based approach, two hypotheses have been developed, that argue that regime 
formation is contingent on Scientific Convergence and Epistemic Communities. Finally, the context-based 
approach does not have any specific hypothesis but argues that regimes formation is facilitated by 
unexpected national and international events.58 While this four-factor analytical model is 
summarized in Figure 2 a more detailed description of each hypothesis can be found in the 
Appendix.  
In their initial study, Young and Osherenko applied this framework to several regimes that 
were established to tackle various environmental problems. This same model has also been used 
in other studies focussed on tracking regime formation with regard to an array of global issues. As 
such, the framework has proven itself capable of providing an analytical basis for studies within 
the field of regime analysis. While its initial creation was aimed at explaining regime formation in 
response to environmental issues, its application to other issue-areas is still justified. In fact, Young 
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Figure 2: Analytical Framework 
and Osherenko argue of the importance to “engage in systematic studies of additional cases using 
the theoretical template we have devised”.59 
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4. Methodological Framework 
When choosing the methodological approach of this thesis several considerations must be made 
regarding the empirical data used, how it will be analysed and how the theory will be 
operationalized. While these questions will be addressed in short order, it can already be stated 
that the primary approach this thesis will adopt is an in-depth case study analysis. The case in 
question is the larger APSA in general but more specifically the two East African RECs; EAC and 
IGAD. The reasoning here is that while the two RECs are the focus objects in this paper, they do 
not exist, nor function, individually, but instead are part and parcel of the overriding APSA. As 
such, an analysis of one will inevitably reflect on the other. The following section will highlight the 
merits of this choice of approach and how it will be operationalized to achieve this paper’s aim.  
 
4.1 Case Study  
Considering that the central aim of this thesis is to track regime formation in East Africa, the 
choice of a case study approach is both useful and appropriate. While there are many 
methodological strategies one could employ in the study of Political Science, case studies are useful 
because they provide valuable insights into the substantive, real-world importance of the case in 
question.60 A common criticism generally aimed at case study analysis, focuses on the approaches 
weakness in producing generalisable findings. While this is indeed a well-founded argument, the 
purposes of this paper, is not to produce generalized conclusions that can be applied broadly, but 
instead to generate a thorough analysis of a specific case through a particular theoretical lens. As 
the aim of this paper is to explain a specific process and not merely describe it, a case study analysis 
alone will not be sufficient. Instead, observations made from the case must be accompanied by a 
theoretical basis that can provide hypotheses that help explain these case-specific observations.61 
The research question of this paper requires a close reading of contextual factors pertinent to East 
Africa, generated from a regime theoretical approach. As such, while not generalizable, the 
conclusions derived from this study will nevertheless contribute to existing regime formation 
scholarship and a better understanding of African security issues and their approaches and 
capabilities in meeting them. Contemporary academic research has increasingly adopted an inter-
disciplinary approach as the boundaries between the scientific fields become more perforated.62 
Addressing the broadening of the research agenda of IR has led to the borrowing and adoption of 
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a larger set of concepts, theories and frameworks. Case studies in this scenario are especially well-
suited, because “the diverse set of information necessary to test complex theories can very often 
be collected only for one case or a few cases”.63  
The choice of case also requires some explanation. As previously mentioned, the 
significance of RECs within considerations of peace and security has increased considerably over 
the years. APSA specifically notes the role played by RECs as vital to realizing the security goals 
of the AU. As such, analysing the role played by regional actors can prove interesting in 
understanding the dynamics of the continental security framework and how security threats are 
addressed. Furthermore, East Africa is especially relevant within discussions of peace and security, 
as the region plays host to several active terrorist groups. The nature of the threat has taken many 
forms, with terrorist acts being perpetrated by both internal and external actors. The Horn of 
Africa has been particularly volatile, with instability there often spilling over into neighbouring 
regions, especially East Africa.  
Nevertheless, when it comes to terrorist organisations, there are two groups that have 
posed the most serious threat in the region. Al-Qaeda has had a long history of activity, with the 
1998 embassy bombings in Kenya and Uganda highlighting their firm hold in the region. In the 
post-9/11 era, the group has been establishing safe havens in countries like Sudan and Somalia, 
used primarily for recruitment, financing and to bolster their ability to launch attacks.64 Al-Shabaab, 
an organisation affiliated with al-Qaeda, has grown in prominence within Somalia and poses the 
most serious threat to countries like Kenya and Uganda. The group has launched several 
devastating attacks in neighbouring countries and due to Somalia’s fragile statehood, the group has 
managed to establish several strongholds in the country.65 With all this in mind, the contextual 
dynamics of the region provides the basis for potential cooperation, especially with regard to 
meeting the terrorist threat that is very real in the region. Considering all this, the case study in 
question provides a perfect opportunity to apply a regime theoretical approach to assess this 
cooperation and how far a security regime has formed. 
 
4.2 Operationalization 
With the choice of methodological approach highlighted above, further elucidation is required 
with regard to how the analysis will be structured and conducted. Considering then the two cases 
that will be analysed and the central questions that will be tackled in this paper, it can be argued 
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that, notwithstanding the case study approach, an exercise in ‘process-tracing’ is also useful. 
Process training, very simply put, is a tool used to “search for necessary and sufficient conditions 
that lead to a specific type of outcome” or to “closely understand the theory-based ‘mechanisms’ 
that actually link causal factors to outcomes”.66 Process tracing subscribes to the basic premise that 
social outcomes are the result of a combination of causal factors and that the effect of these causal 
factors can differ due to contextual heterogeneities. This approach is especially well suited to 
understanding the many and complex causes of a specific outcome, rather than gauging the causes 
effectiveness.67 This approach is well-suited for this paper as I am interested in the pressures, 
motivations and decision-making mechanisms and processes that lead to an outcome, which in 
this case is the formation of a security regime.  
As noted above the ‘regime perspective’ has proven to be a useful analytical tool that has 
strived to theorize and hypothesize international cooperation and the driving forces behind it. 
Regimes have grown to tackle a wide variety of issues within the study of international relations, 
which merits its further analysis. This thesis will focus solely on the emergence of security regimes 
with a specific focus on the African context. In order to achieve the goals of this paper, the central 
tenets of regime theory will be drawn upon and utilized. Using a regime theoretical framework, 
the analysis of this paper will be conducted in two parts. In order to track the formation of a 
regime, one must understand the different phases this process goes through. As such, this thesis 
will borrow from Levy et al. who argue that there are at least three stages present in regime 
formation: agenda formation, institutional choice and operationalization.68 This first stage considers the 
emergence of a specific issue on the political agenda. On the international stage it is not unusual 
for several issues to compete for a place at the top of the agenda, but for this to happen three 
regulatory factors are often used to prioritize a specific issue.69 The first factor consists of activities 
by actors or organizations that serve as gatekeepers in the political system. The second type 
considers the nature of the issue and the significance it poses to society. In this case, an issue with 
a large societal effect will place higher on the agenda. The third and final factor considers the 
cultural norms associated with the issue. Exogenous events or crises often cement these values 
and norms which in turn increases the issues importance.70 Following on, the second stage of 
regime formation spans the whole negotiation period. This process begins with the initiation of 
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focussed negotiations and ends with the signing of an agreement. Here, hard bargaining dictates 
much of the progress made during this process, as the end goal is to seek mutually acceptable 
terms. The third stage, operationalization, spans the period from signing the agreement to its entry 
into force and also considers when the agreement is transformed into practice. Simply put, this 
stage considers the implementation of the agreement, in that the rules and provisions are brought 
to bear on those party to the agreement. Indicators for this stage include ratification of relevant 
agreements by member states, but also the establishment of relevant institutions and structures to 
help implement the provisions. While these three stages may seem to have a linear quality about 
them, it is important to state that there is often a significant amount of overlap between the phases.  
This model (Figure 3) will be applied to the case in question and will form the first phase 
of the analysis. By tracking the three stages in the chosen cases, we will have begun to answer the 
central question of this thesis.  
 
However, this will not shed light on the circumstances or dynamics that have led to the 
formation or how it can be understood. As such, the next phase of the analysis will employ the 
analytical framework (Figure 2) developed by Young and Osherenko. Though this application, a 
better understanding of contextual factors as well as the underlying processes of regime formation 
can be unearthed. The aim here is not to necessarily provide a definite answer of whether a security 
regime has formed, but instead to evaluate if this process has occurred (and why), how far it has 
come and the conditions that may have not yet been satisfied. It is important to note that these 
two frameworks are not disconnected from each other. In fact, they are closely linked analytically, 
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in that the social factors of power, interests and knowledge are both present and influential in the 
three stages of regime formation.  
 
4.3 Empirical Material and Limitations  
Considering the above, it is now appropriate to turn to the empirical material that will be used in 
this paper. Both primary and secondary sources from the case study will form the empirical basis 
of this study as the main focus is on interpreting information through the theoretical perspective 
I have highlighted above. The material that will be utilized will be pulled from official sources and 
will include annual reports, documents, agreements and strategies that have a focus on CT and are 
pertinent to East Africa and the two chosen RECs. As such, documents that have been drafted by 
the OAU and AU, as well as IGAD and the EAC, will constitute a significant part of the empirical 
material used. However, the material analysed will not be limited to only expansive reports and 
documents but will also include meeting protocols, summary reports, summit agendas and other 
relevant sources that once again take up the issue at hand. Considering that the process tracing 
approach will be utilized, books, journals and articles will also be drawn from to provide a better 
understanding of the historical context of the case study but also the decision-making processes 
and that underpin it. 
This thesis will apply a relatively broad focus as the historical context of the region is an 
important factor that cannot be discounted. As such, the time period that will be covered in this 
study spans from 1990 to 2018. The start date of the study period was chosen for several reasons. 
While this thesis focuses on present CT security frameworks in Africa, due regard must be given 
to the founding documents that were drafted under the auspices of the OAU, which still hold 
contemporary significance. Furthermore, CT strategies on the African continent during the Cold 
War were largely non-existent and only came into being in the being at the beginning of the 1990s. 
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5. Analysis  
With the theoretical and methodological frameworks contextualized above, an analysis aimed at 
tracking potential regime formation in East Africa can now be carried out. The analysis will be 
conducted in two stages. The first phase will apply Levy et al. model (Figure 3) to track/test which 
stages of regime formation have been fulfilled. The second phase will then apply the analytical 
framework (Figure 2) which will aim to highlight the interactions, motivations and processes that 
have led to institutional arrangements. In short, the first phase will aim to test if and how far regime 
formation has come, while the second phase will aim to explain it. When considering the African 
peace and security framework, one must take into account the operational nature that drives it. 
What distinguishes this framework from other strategies adopted in Europe and Asia is its 
decentralized nature. Central to the AU’s security policy is the strengthening of security structures 
at the regional level, which are to function as pillars to support the maintenance of peace and 
stability on the entire continent. Simply put, regional strategies and approaches are largely 
reflections of plans made on the continental level.71 As such when discussing CT approaches in 
East Africa, it is worth considering broader continental strategies as they invariably influence each 
other due to their symbiotic nature. 
 
5.1 Three Stages of Regime Formation 
5.1.1 Agenda Formation 
Considering the first stage of regime formation, it is not surprising that the issue of CT has 
dominated international discourses and has become a matter of global concern. Despite this, 
tracking this process and seeing how the issue of terrorism has evolved on the continent is a 
necessary step in fulfilling the agenda-setting phase of regime formation. Like most discourses in 
Africa’s history, the issue of terrorism and how the continent was introduced to and engaged with 
the global threat was influenced by exogenous events. The post-Cold War era saw little security-
related interests in Africa. This position was underscored in the 1995 U.S. Security Strategy for 
Sub-Saharan Africa which considered the African continent a low priority as it offered “little 
traditional strategic interests”.72 This was also reflective of regional sentiments as the majority of 
strategies that were implemented at that time sought to consolidated developmental and economic 
gains, instead of security-driven ones. While considerable focus was placed on stabilizing fragile 
states after the proxy wars of the Cold War era, the issue of terrorism was largely non-existent.  
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There were, however, initial indications of terrorist activity that began to manifest in the 
beginning in the 1990s. Central here was Sudan, which not only hosted notable figures like Osama 
bin Landen but grew to become the epicentre of the militant Islamist world.73 During his time in 
Sudan, bin Laden was able to recruit members, obtain financing and establish cells, all of which 
contributed to al-Qaeda’s growth, in turn, awakening external interests in the region. This 
ultimately culminated in the in the 1998 al-Qaeda bombings of the US embassies in Nairobi and 
Dar e Salaam, which thrust the region into global discussions of the threat of terrorism and its 
transnational implications.74 This was further exacerbated by the simultaneous attacks on an Israeli-
owned hotel in Mombasa, Kenya and an Israeli commercial airliner in 2002, both of which were 
claimed by al-Qaeda. The US response to the attacks was obviously swift, with then-President 
Clinton denouncing the acts as ‘inhuman’ and vying to use all means to “bring those responsible 
to justice, no matter what or how long it takes”.75 The attacks also drew condemnation from the 
wider international community, with the United Nations (UN) releasing a statement denouncing 
the incident and claiming that the suppression of acts of international terrorism was essential for 
the “maintenance of international peace and security”.76 Similarly, statements by Kenyan and 
Tanzanian leaders underscored the need to address the issue of international terrorism as the 
attacks “exemplified the expanding reach and growing menace of the perpetrators of terrorist 
acts”.77 
The Embassy bombings proved to be a starting point for America’s intolerance of 
terrorism that would define the tenure of future presidents. However, the real catalyst proved to 
be the 9/11 terrorist attacks which drastically altered how the world dealt with the terrorist threat. 
The African continent was drawn into the GWOT relatively early as demonstrated by several US 
national security strategies. In 2002, a link between the weak states in Africa and terrorist activity 
was highlighted in their national security strategy, which argued that the US, with their “European 
allies we must help strengthen Africa’s fragile state […] to deny safe haven to terrorists”.78  Susan 
Rice, former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, underscored these claims arguing that 
terror groups “take advantage of Africa’s porous borders, weak law enforcement and security 
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services […] to move men, weapons, and money around the globe”.79 By framing specific regions 
of Africa as potential incubators to a very serious threat, the US was also aware that their security 
interests were contingent upon “partnering with Africans to strengthen fragile and failing states 
and bring ungoverned areas under the control of effective democracies”.80 As such, African 
counterparts also played a role in the framing of the issue. Central here has been the AU, which 
was established shortly after the 9/11 attacks. As a more security orientated actor, the AU has 
repeatedly highlighted terrorism and extremism as “new security threats” that “remain a major 
concern”.81 Similarly, the AU 2063 Agenda, that sets out the ultimate vision of the organization, 
considers a peaceful and secure Africa as one of its aspirations, with the “eradication of 
terrorism”82 one of its specific goals. More recently the AU Commissioner for Peace and Security, 
Smaïl Chergui, echoed these concerns by stating that “‘Terrorism and violent extremism remain 
major sources of concern to the African Union, which is convinced that countering these 
phenomena must underlie the efforts aimed at putting an end to the factors favouring their 
spread”.83 
While the threat of terrorism has been clearly highlighted by both international and 
continental actors, specific focus on regions in Africa have also been emphasised, namely East 
Africa. At the 2014 Peace and Security Council meeting, it was noted that the spread of terrorism 
in Africa to areas “that previously did not perceive the seriousness of the threat” has become a 
reality. As such, the “terrorist threat in Africa has been shaped by activities in North, West, East 
and Central Africa”, with Al Shabaab constituting the main threat for countries in East Africa. 
Furthermore, Al Shabaab's “ability to expand its terror campaign beyond the Somali borders” has 
increased insecurity in the region, with all neighbouring countries vulnerable to attack by the 
terrorist group.84 This focus on East Africa as a focal point in discussions of international terrorism 
is also evident in the security strategies adopted by the US. Kenya has been singled out as an 
important ally in America's fight against terrorism, with the country being considered an “essential 
sub-regional linchpin”.85 This sentiment has been repeated, with Kenya encompassing a role as 
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“an active and critical partner in the war on terrorism” that continues to be a “strong ally of the 
United States”. 86 
The above highlights some important points. It is quite clear that the issue of terrorism in 
Africa has not only taken its place on the global agenda but that the East African region has come 
to play an important role in the wider GWOT. Notwithstanding this, East African has also featured 
prominently in continental peace and security considerations, due to the regions terrorist activity, 
but also because of its geostrategic relevance. Furthermore, the matter of combating terrorism has 
evolved over many years, as the issue has gained differing levels of prominence on the global 
agenda. Gatekeepers in the form of the US as well as regional actors like Kenya have played an 
important role in driving the issue to prominence. The issue has also evolved intact with exogenous 
events, like the 1998 embassy bombings and the more recent 9/11 attacks, which have both 
conceptualized the threat as well as highlighted the shortcomings of the region in dealing with it.  
Nevertheless, the issue has clearly influenced policymakers on the ground which has led to an array 
of explicit negotiations on the matter. 
 
5.1.2 Institutional Bargaining 
Considering the above, the issue of terrorism has obviously evolved over several decades, due in 
large part to contextual factors that occurred both internationally and locally. The development of 
a CT framework in Africa, but more specifically East Africa, has in turn evolved intact with these 
contextual factors. As such, much of the institutional bargaining that constitutes the second phase 
of regime formation took place and was a reflection of, local and wider happenings within CT 
discourses. Tracking this evolution is important to gauge the nature and dynamics that shaped this 
process. 
 While the post 9/11 era has widely been considered the defining landmark in the fight 
against terrorism, global and regional CT efforts can nevertheless be dated back to an earlier 
period. With regard to African responses, a framework aimed at addressing terrorist threats on the 
continent came into force already at the beginning of the 1990s. The Resolution on the Strengthening 
of Cooperation and Coordination among African States was a landmark document aimed at fighting the 
phenomenon of extremism and terrorism through, among other things, strengthened cooperation 
and coordination.87 This initial response was further strengthened in 1994, by the adoption of the 
Declaration on the Code of Conduct for Inter-African Relations. This declaration was clear in stressing the 
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unequivocal denunciation of all forms of extremism and terrorism “whatever their nature, origin 
and form, especially fanaticism and extremism based on religion, politics and tribalism”.88 Despite 
the promulgation of these two documents, proactive responses to the threat were few and far 
between, as they not only lacked legal authority but they were vague in their definitions of terrorist 
and extremist behaviour. 
This changed with the drafting of the 1999 OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating 
of Terrorism. The drafting of the so-called Algiers Convention so close to the 1998 embassy 
bombings was by no means incidental, as the attacks highlighted severe inadequacies that 
demonstrated the far-reaching effects and damage that terrorism posed to the continent.89 The 
document aimed to address these inadequacies by providing a comprehensive and binding 
framework for CT activity on the continent. The Convention provided specific measures that 
signatories were required to undertake that included the enforcement of legislative frameworks 
aimed at punishing terrorist acts and the implementation of CT instruments and measures.90 More 
importantly however, the Convention provided an operational definition of what constituted a 
terrorist act. Included in this definition were identifiable actions and activities, the motives and 
aims that drive them and their intended targets.91 The Convention was however clear in noting the 
exclusion of ‘freedom fighters’ from the terrorist designation.92 This specific clause was due, by in 
large, to African historical experiences, where Western colonial actors frequently used the terrorist 
label to delegitimize resistance and liberation movements. 
 The promulgation of the 1999 Convention foreshadowed a significant development on 
the continent, namely the institutional shift away from the OAU and establishment of the AU. As 
previously noted, the formation of the AU saw a concerted effort to bolster the continents peace 
and security framework, resulting in APSA. Central to this new strategy has been the incorporation 
of CT measures that have come to define security concerns on the continent. This endeavour has 
been realized through several different initiatives. The drafting of the APSA also saw the formation 
of the PSC, which functions as an enforcement organ and has as one of its key objectives to 
“coordinate and harmonize continental efforts in the prevention and combating of international 
terrorism in all its aspects”.93 Similarly, The Solemn Declaration on a Common African Defence and Security 
Policy considers “international terrorism and terrorist activities” as a threat that poses “challenges 
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to Africa’s continental security”.94 In 2004, the AUs CT framework was further bolstered by the 
adoption of the Protocol to the 1999 Algiers Convention. In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, this 
protocol aimed at further enhancing the effective implementation of the Convention.95 
Following on, while driving forces on a continental level have advanced counter-terrorism 
measures, similar endeavours have been undertaken at the regional level in East Africa. Here the 
two RECs have played a central role in shouldering much of the CT activity in the region, with 
both actors drafting their own respective strategies to meet the threat. IGAD has dealt with 
security issues since 1996 with the drafting of the IGAD Agreement that stipulated the 
communities commitment to the “maintenance of regional peace, stability and security”.96 In 2003 
the Draft Implementation Plan to Counter Terrorism in the IGAD region was drafted, indicating 
the communities increasingly proactive role in bolstering cooperation and CT capabilities in the 
region. This was further strengthened in 2006 with the launch of the IGAD Capacity Building 
Program against Terrorism (ICPAT), which aimed to “improve border control, step up legal 
support, enhance interdepartmental involvement, provide training to those to educate against 
terrorism and to also provide alternative cooperative method solving”.97 Despite operating for five 
years, ICPAT was later replaced with the IGAD Security Sector Program (ISSP) in 2011 as it was 
unable to meet the evolving security challenges in the region.  
Moving on to the other REC in East Africa, the EAC has also drafted several CT strategies 
in their efforts to meet evolving threats. Already in the Treaty for the Establishment of the EAC 
was terrorism noted as a particular threat to the region’s security, which necessitated cooperation 
between Partner States.98 The imperative to address the threat of terrorism was further 
strengthened in 2006 with the implementation of the Regional Strategy on Peace and Security, 
which functions as a guiding document that encouraged enhanced regional security cooperation 
through, among other things, information exchanges, law enforcement coordination and tighter 
border controls.99 Similarly, EAC Member States have also signed a Protocol on Cooperation in 
Defence Affairs, which promises collaboration around four pillars, including military training, joint 
operations, technical cooperation and exchange of information.100 The EAC has also implemented 
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in 2013 the Protocol on Peace and Security, which notes combating terrorism as a central goal of 
the community that requires member states to “develop common measures, strategies and 
programmes”101 to meet. This protocol has functioned as a steering document that informs many 
of the strategies developed by the EAC with regard to peace and security in the region. However, 
more specific institutions have also been introduced in the region. The EAC Early Warning 
Mechanism (EWM) and the Eastern African Standby Force (EASF) have been set up to bolster 
proactive action against terrorist activity in the region. 
The above demonstrates two important points. Firstly, is that the issue of terrorism and 
violent extremism is an important problem that does not lie at the periphery of both continental 
or regional security strategies, but instead often shapes and dictates the security policies mandated. 
Secondly, due to the importance of the issue, combatting terrorism has become heavily codified 
in conventions, protocols, strategies and roadmaps at the continental and regional level. It is also 
clear that while an African CT framework can be traced back to the early 1990s, strategies and 
policies introduced have evolved to deal with contextual realities on the ground. This has been 
evident by the plethora of strategies adopted after the 1998 terrorist attacks and the more recent 
9/11 attacks. 
 
5.1.3 Operationalization  
Moving on, the last stage of regime formations considers how the provisions and rules of the 
drafted agreements have been brought to bear on the party states. Essentially this stage considers 
how the agreements have been implemented into practice. Here, the dynamics of this stage involve 
efforts to ratify treaties, pass legislation and assign responsibility and programs for implementation. 
International efforts also contribute to this stage, as financial and expert support can be offered to 
realize the goals of the agreements signed. When considering this phase, it must be stated that the 
security framework being developed by the AU and relevant RECs is very much still evolving and 
as such full conceptualization is not necessarily present. Nevertheless, highlighting the efforts that 
have been taken so far to operationalize CT strategies can provide insights into the level of regime 
formation that has occurred in East Africa.  
 The first concrete effort to provide a framework for implementation came with the 
drafting of the 2002 Algiers Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism in 
Africa. This plan of action was geared towards implementing the provisions of the Algiers 
Convention by providing concrete steps that member states could take to bolster their CT 
capabilities. Specific provisions included enhancement of border control and surveillance, digitized 
                                                 
101 EAC (November 2013), Protocol on Peace and Security ; Article 6. 
 33 
immigration records to track movement, biometric passports and the introduction of a framework 
to regulate financing of terrorism. The plan also requested that all members states report the steps 
they have taken to prevent and combat terrorism on an annual basis.102 The above mentioned 
IGAD ISSP is another mechanism that was introduced to implement CT strategies in East Africa. 
The programs central goal is the fostering of peace and security in the IGAD region, with CT 
being one of four main pillars to its strategy. The program, through workshops, seminars and 
training, aims at aiding CT measures by addressing issues such as countering radicalization, violent 
extremism and the financing of terrorism, as well as establishing best practices for effective CT 
and bolstering intelligence and legal assistance and cooperation.103 
While many of the agreements that have been signed, outline strategies and obligations to 
be implemented, they do lack necessary guiding mechanisms. In order to address this issue and 
provide the necessary technical coordination, the African Centre for the Study and Research on 
Terrorism (ACSRT) was established in 2004. The aim of the Centre is to strengthen the capacity 
of member states to address issues relating to terrorism by providing guidance, expertise, training 
and research-driven information and data.104 The centre provides a forum for interaction and 
cooperation among member states and RECs, to develop viable strategies and foster CT best 
practices. Similarly, in a bid to harmonize legal approaches to CT on the continent, the African 
Model Anti-Terrorism Law was introduced in 2011. The law will serve as a legislative blueprint that 
member states can draw from to strengthen and update their own national CT legislation.105  
Recently and in a bid to better understand the drivers of extremism in East Africa, the Centre of 
Excellence in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism was set up with the simple vision of reducing 
violent extremism in the region. The centre aims “to bring together State and non-State actors 
involved in preventing and countering violent extremism to develop and implement coherent 
strategies to build resilience against violent extremism in the Horn and Eastern Africa”.106 Once 
again, the centre functions as a mechanism for the implementation of the many of the CT strategies 
that have been implemented at the continental and regional level. 
While policy formation to develop a CT framework as well as the establishment of 
institutions to ensure its implementation have proven successful, the operationalization of many 
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of the CT strategies drafted remains inadequate. While the AU has developed a progressive CT 
framework, that has also influenced similar regional initiatives, implementation remains the biggest 
challenge. This is further exacerbated by the low level of ratification by member states of principle 
conventions and treaties as well as an, at times, apparent lack of political will.  
  
5.2 Factor-based Approaches 
With the three stages of regime formation highlighted above, we can now apply the analytical 
framework presented previously in order to critically assess the driving forces behind the formation 
of a security regime in East Africa. The application of the framework will aim to highlight the 
explanatory merits of the four factor-based arguments and whether they can help in understanding 
the dynamics that have led to security cooperation in East Africa (see Appendix for a full 
description of the framework).  
 
5.2.1 The Power-based Argument  
The power-based argument, that is situated within the realist IR tradition, considers the central 
role of a hegemon in the formation of a regime. In this case, it is useful to consider whether this 
argument holds sway within the context of East Africa and whether it can shed some light on the 
dynamics behind a security regime formation. The central argument raised by the power-based 
approach posits that the emergence of international arrangements is reliant on power being 
concentrated in the hands of a single dominant actor. This position argues that the spread of power 
between too many actors drives up transaction costs, thus reducing the chance for interstate 
cooperation. The hegemonic stance can be divided into two schools of thought; the benign hegemon 
and coercive hegemon. The former considers a leader that exercises positive leadership to influence 
other actors to adopt its preferences, shouldering most of the transactional costs in the process. 
The latter on the other hand refers to an actor that uses its power to impose the institutional 
arrangements it prefers on a group. 107 As such, in the context of East Africa, this position would 
argue that the presence of a hegemon is a necessary requirement for the establishment of 
institutional arrangements that could lead to a security regime. When testing this argument, 
however, it can from the offset be established that there is no one outright hegemon in East Africa. 
Despite this, the merits of the power-based approach can still be tested by critically analysing the 
power dynamics that characterize CT strategies in East Africa. 
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 As the previous sections have already highlighted, the US has had a significant role in lifting 
the issue of terrorism onto the global agenda. Furthermore, with East Africa’s geopolitical 
significance within the GWOT, the US has vested interests in the development of a CT strategy 
in the region. As such, the role of the US in influencing the formation of such a framework in East 
Africa cannot be discounted. The US has held a position of a global hegemon for most of the 
post-Cold War era, and despite the rise of other actors on the global stage, within security matters, 
the US holds unparalleled strength. Their influence in East Africa has been plain, but US 
engagements in the region have largely taken the form of economic or capacity related assistance.  
Both Kenya and Tanzania have been heavy recipients of the Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program 
(ATA), which has provided considerable training and equipment to law enforcement agents with 
the aim of developing and bolstering a wide spectrum of CT skills in both countries. This initiative 
also organized the East Africa Joint Operations (EAJO) exercise, which brought together law 
enforcement officers from Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda with the aim of testing and enhancing 
the participants’ responses to terrorist attacks.108 Following on, the US has also initiated two 
regional partnership; the Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (PREACT) and 
the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA). The former, funded by the US and 
established in 2009 is “designed to build the capacity and cooperation of military, law enforcement, 
and civilian actors across East Africa to counter terrorism in a comprehensive fashion”.109 The 
latter program has represented America’s most militarized response to terrorism in the region, as 
thousands of US troops have been deployed to provide support for CT related operations in the 
region. The Task Force has used its “strategic location as a critical power projection platform” to 
“prevent violent extremist organizations from threatening America”.110  
 With this background in mind, applying the power-based approach does have some merit. 
While it is irresponsible to claim that the US embodies a position as an outright hegemon in the 
region, its status as a benign hegemon may provide some credence to this claim. The US, since 2015 
alone, has delivered hundreds of millions of security-related aid to several countries in East Africa, 
with the specific aim of reducing violent extremism. As such, the US has managed to assert its 
authority, not through coercion, but by adopting a positive leadership approach which aims to 
influence other actors to adopt its preferences. In short, it can be argued that the US has influenced 
the promotion of a security regime in East Africa as a public good, in order to consolidate their 
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own intangible long-term gains; in this case, protecting its own national security from terrorist 
groups that are active in the region.   
 Moving on, while there is no one single hegemon in East Africa, there are nevertheless 
two countries that have emerged as regional leaders; Ethiopia and Kenya. Both countries have 
experienced considerable economic growth in the past decade and have also evolved as prominent 
security agents in the region. Similarly, both countries are closely allied with the US within the 
GWOT and both are important figures in maintaining peace and stability in the region. This 
dynamic has led to regional divisions with both countries looking to assert their position, which 
has understandably affected security cooperation. It has been argued that Ethiopia has used IGAD 
as a conduit to exercise its own power. Here, it has been noted that Ethiopia has on several 
occasions, acted through IGAD as an indirect means to address its own security matters, which 
has driven concerns about the representative nature of the REC.111 As such this has led other 
countries like Kenya, to focus its interests instead on the EAC. Kenya has long had strong 
economic ties with its fellow EAC members and as such has tended to align itself stronger with 
the EAC on security matters. The construction of a cohesive East African CT strategy has 
therefore been hampered by the conflict over regional hegemony between Kenya and Ethiopia. 
As such the hypotheses that a bipolar distribution of power or the existence of a directorate do not 
provide much explanatory value. It seems that both countries have sought to opt for sub-regional 
arrangements to realize their goals, to the detriment of the formation of a singular East African 
CT security regime.  
 Considering these arguments, applying the power-based approach in the strictest sense 
does not explain regime formation. Nevertheless, the power dynamics that have been highlighted 
do raise some interesting points that cannot be discounted. The benign power exerted by the US 
in the region could explain why the issue has received the attention it has, as US economic 
assistance could be contingent on the countries in East Africa investing in CT strategies. As such, 
the US as an external actor could be credited with pushing the agenda forward but also 
operationalizing the CT frameworks in the form of capacity building trainings and large sums of 
investment. Following on, the relationship between Ethiopia and Kenya, while not strained in the 
political sense, does affect power dynamics in the region. As both countries seek to establish some 
form of dominance, the formation of a representative and effective CT framework, can be severely 
hindered. However, considering that the underlying interests of the two countries on this issue are 
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relatively similar, the above-mentioned argument may not be relevant. The following section will 
delve deeper into this idea. 
 
5.2.2 The Interest-based Argument  
The power-based approach highlighted above sheds some light on how power dynamics have 
shaped interactions on security matters in East Africa. However, the neo-liberal driven school of 
thought is equally useful. The interest-based approach considers the underlying constellation of 
interests as a central driving force in the formation of institutional arrangements. At its most basic, 
this position holds that regimes arise from the interactions of self-interested actors that coordinate 
their behaviour to ensure joint gains. In the context of East Africa, the joint gain in question can 
be considered overall peace and security in the region, as it would push states to cooperate to 
address specific threats that jeopardize it, i.e. terrorism. The interest-based approach lists several 
explanations that explain regime formation. By critically considering these arguments we can 
evaluate the explanatory merits of this approach, and also highlight the shortcomings of 
institutional arrangements in place. 
When considering the issue of state interests with regard to terrorism in East Africa one 
has to consider how the states are impacted by the problem at hand. Interests in the issue have 
both wavered and grown over the years which has, in turn, affected the level of cooperation 
witnessed. As highlighted previously, terrorism as an act was not properly defined until the drafting 
of the Algiers Convention. Interests in forming a CT framework were low before this, but the 
1998 embassy bombings thrust the issue into global and regional considerations. At that time, 
there was a collective call for a comprehensive framework to deal with the new threat of terrorism, 
Which culminated in the Algiers Convention and the operationalization of a working definition of 
a terrorist act. This mentality for the need for a collective agenda on the issue of CT came to define 
security considerations in the subsequent years.  
The merits of joint action in the fight against terrorism in East Africa have been highlighted 
in several strategies and policies drafted in the region. The EAC Protocol on Peace and Security 
underscores the need to “cooperate in counter-terrorism measures within the Community”,112 
while the Regional Strategy for Peace and Security mirrors these sentiments but specifies 
cooperation through information exchanges, law enforcement coordination and tighter border 
controls.113 Similarly, the several strategies adopted by IGAD in response to security matters have 
                                                 
112 EAC (November 2013). 
113 EAC, 'Regional Strategy for Peace and Security (adopted by the 13th EAC Council of Ministers meeting, Arusha, 
Tanzania).'. 
 38 
all underscored the significance of collective action, as the member states have agreed that no 
individual member is able to single-handedly deal with the issue effectively.114 Here, the hypothesis 
of policy priority, that considers that a regime forms only when an issue has a high priority status, is 
confirmed by the above examples. Security issues, and especially terrorism has created an 
imperative for East African states to adopt an organized response. Both RECs have therefore 
pursued strategies based on achieving collective gains in terms of a better CT framework to bolster 
regional peace and stability. Here, the hypothesis that regimes form when there is a willingness to 
set aside narrow national interests in favour of some broader conception of the common good is also 
satisfied. Once again, the notion of collective action in response to security issues has been 
prominent in East Africa, as the member states have functioned in favour of promoting overall 
regional stability. An example that highlights this stance has been the EACs leading role in 
attempting to resolve the instability in Burundi. By taking on this role as lead mediator to the 
conflict, the EAC has underscored its support for a collective security approach, understanding 
the potential spill-over effects of instability in Burundi. Furthermore, this engagement also 
highlights the increasingly decentralized nature of the AUs security approach, which favours the 
principle of regional subsidiarity.115 
Moving on, the hypothesis that integrative bargaining is necessary for regime formation to 
occur is also a relevant factor in this context. What is important here is the form of bargaining that 
sees states collaborate to find win-win solutions, in that they are mutually beneficial for the actors 
involved. The institutional arrangements that are in place in East Africa in response to the issue of 
terrorism, have not evolved out of unitary actions, but are a result of coordinated efforts by the 
member states of the region. These efforts have almost exclusively taken place at organized 
summits, which have functioned as meeting places for heads of state to hold talks on specific 
issues. The 35th ordinary session of the OAU summit held in Algiers saw a large turnout from 
African leaders and also saw the adoption of the Algiers Convention. Similarly, the Protocol to the 
Algiers Convention was adopted in 2004 by the 3rd ordinary session of the Assembly of the Union, 
held in Addis Ababa, after a proposal was made by 28 heads of states that met in Dakar three years 
earlier.116  
This same trend has also been evident in the two RECs in East Africa. With regards to 
IGAD, the first articulation of a CT agenda was broached at the 2002 9th IGAD Summit of the 
Assembly of Heads of State and Government in Khartoum, which eventually led to the 
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development of the Draft Implementation Plan to Counter Terrorism in the IGAD Region at a 
2003 IGAD conference held in Addis Ababa, that was ultimately approved during the 10th IGAD 
summit in Kampala a year later.117 Similarly, within the EAC the Protocol on Cooperation in 
Defence Affairs was adopted at the 10th Head of State Extra Ordinary Meeting held on April 28th, 
2012. This agreement came about after an elaborate process of negotiation between the individual 
member states about the legal and administrative grey zones associated with defence cooperation. 
The EAC Protocol on Peace and Security also followed a similar process, as it was only after years 
of lengthy negotiations that the EAC member states signed the Protocol in 2013.118 
These summits have proven useful in bringing together the member states to discuss a 
specific issue in order to find equitable solutions. The hypothesis that relevant parties have to be 
involved is also satisfied here as well as the issue of equity. These summits provide all member 
states with a platform to articulate their interests and negotiate a consensual solution to the 
problem. The countries in East Africa are represented at these meetings and are able to articulate 
their interests when drafting the strategies that have come to define the regions CT framework. 
Here, the hypothesis of individual leadership would also be relevant, but it is difficult to determine 
the exact role played by specific actors during this process.  
Considering the argument of salient solutions, which states that the adoption of equitable 
and simple solutions to the issue at hand facilitates institutional arrangements, several examples 
can be highlighted from the East African context. The Eastern African Police Chiefs Organization 
(EAPCCO) is one such initiative that has been introduced to bolster regional integration and 
facilitate a more streamlined approach to dealing with transnational crimes in the region. The 
EAPCCO highlights a concerted effort by the regions member states to coordinate their efforts, 
which has achieved through, among other things, joint exercises. The organizations first joint 
exercise was held in 2013 in Kampala and focussed specifically on counterterrorism.119 The Eastern 
Africa Standby Force (EASF) is another good example of the adoption of a joint effort by the East 
African states. The EASF has established itself as a multi-national structure committed to “act 
collectively to preserve peace, security and stability in the Eastern African region”.120 The EASF 
has worked actively with member states to bolster the capacity of their armed forces through 
military exercises and trainings. The significance of the force is twofold; firstly, it marks a positive 
step towards a fully integrated regional response to security matters and secondly it provides a 
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unique setting for member states to build trust and a shared understanding of the threats they face. 
As such, several initiatives have been adopted in the East African region, with the understanding 
that a shared approach based on collaboration is necessary for creating effective solutions to the 
terror threat. These institutions also function as compliance mechanisms, which is an argument that 
will be further addressed in the next section.  
Exogenous shocks or crises, which are important events that can mobilize political will to 
address a specific issue, can also be useful in explaining regime formation. This argument will, 
however, be analysed in section 6.2.4 (Context-based argument). All in all, it can be surmised that 
the CT framework that has developed in East Africa has evolved out of the consensual pursuit of 
collective security in the region. Within the EAC and IGAD, collective concerns of the 
vulnerabilities against terrorist groups have pushed forward strategies to increase cooperation and 
collaboration. Furthermore, it was established relatively early that an effective CT framework 
required a joint effort, as there is no one country in East Africa, with the resources or political 
sway, to shoulder the responsibility on its own. Science and technology is also offered as an explanation 
for regime formation. The hypothesis here states that increased considerations of the problem at 
hand through scientific or technological perspectives and not political ones can facilitate the 
formation of a regime. In the context of this thesis, the issue of terrorism is not one that requires 
a technical response and as such this hypothesis is not very relevant. However, while not technical 
or scientific, the responses to the terrorist threat can nevertheless be formed from within the 
academic world. This point will be elaborated on in the following section.  
 
5.2.3 The Knowledge-based Argument 
Moving on, the Knowledge-based approach borrows heavily from the cognitivist school of 
thought that emphasises the role of knowledge, norms and values and how they shape state 
preferences and as such state behaviour. Normative changes, especially with regard to security 
issues, have been evident on the African continent. Understanding and assessing these shifts can 
help determine their role in shaping state behaviour and how it has influenced responses to security 
issues. 
A central normative shift has been witnessed with regard to how African states have 
engaged with security issues on the continent. This shift coincided with the transformation from 
the OAU to the AU, where a norm of non-interference was replaced with a norm of non-
indifference. This normative change was principally initiated at the AU level, but it has nevertheless 
come to inform regional initiatives as well. The East African region has played a significant role in 
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this paradigm shift. Not only has it illustrated the entrenched nature of non-interference within 
the OAU, but it has also functioned as the site for the AU to enforce the norm of non-indifference. 
As has been highlighted in previous sections, the formation of the OAU was borne out of 
the need to consolidate gains made during the decolonisation process. It is therefore not surprising 
that the principles of sovereignty and non-interference were treated with deference and came to 
colour the future actions of the OAU. This stance is most clearly portrayed in the 1963 OAU 
Charter, which lists its guiding principles as “the sovereign equality of all members” and “non-
interference in the internal affairs of states”.121 This strong stance against violations of sovereignty 
was especially problematic for the OAU’s ability to address conflict and security threats. This was 
most clearly illustrated during the 1978 Uganda-Tanzania conflict, which highlighted the 
entrenched nature of the norm of non-interference. The conflict escalated, with acts of aggression 
on both sides, eventually resulting in regime change and the ousting of Ugandan leader Idi Amin. 
The OAU, during this process, was largely silent except for a few half-hearted diplomatic efforts. 
The inaction can be explained by the apparent unwillingness of the OAU to circumvent principle 
of sovereignty to intervene.122 
The transformation of the OAU to the AU saw however a shift in. The new rational saw 
the need to evaluate the way conflicts and threats were handled. This saw the introduction of a 
new norm of non-indifference, which emphasized a new responsibility to take action in the name 
of safeguarding peace and security. This sentiment is reflected in the Constitutive Act of the 
African Union, which provides for “the right of the Union to intervene in a member state […] in 
respect to grave circumstances”123 with threats to peace and stability included here.  This has 
especially been relevant in the East African region, which has in recent times been the site of AU 
interventions that has cemented the new norm. Conflicts in Burundi, Sudan and Kenya have all 
elicited a response from the AU, which has mandated peacekeeping forces, pursued diplomatic 
talks and enforced legal proceedings with the aim of restoring peace and stability. The case of 
Somalia has come to represent AU initiatives that would not have been possible if the normative 
change away from non-interference had not been widely accepted on the continent. Somalia’s case 
is especially significant within the context of this thesis. The African Union Mission in Somalia 
(AMISOM) is a regional peacekeeping mission that is made up of contingents from the East 
African states. One of its central aims has been to support the restoration of stability in the country 
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by, among other things, aiding in the fight against the al-Shabaab terrorist group.124 What this 
highlights, is a shift away from the norm of non-intervention and the embrace by many East 
African countries of the principle of non-indifference, especially when it comes to issues of 
regional peace and stability. 
The knowledge-based approach also considers the value of shared understandings of 
beliefs, values and ideas, which is possible through the promotion and spread of knowledge. Here, 
the formation of epistemic communities, which are a collection of individuals with shared 
understandings and common views on an issue, is central to creating the necessary conditions for 
this common stance. This approach argues that with a shared understanding of the issue at hand, 
cooperation is more likely and as such the formation of a regime is made easier. When it comes to 
the region, the spread of knowledge has been a primary function of research institutes that have 
come to represent an important tool within the CT framework. Several institutes have been formed 
with the specific aim of producing knowledge on the issue of terrorism and how to counter it. On 
the continental level, the ACSRT has taken on this role and has worked to help assess the threat 
of terrorism in the different countries, produce information and raise awareness on these issues 
and develop strategies to address them.125 At the regional level, this imperative has also been 
adopted by the Nyerere Centre for Peace Research and the Centre of Excellence in Preventing 
and Countering Violent Extremism, which have both focussed on producing timely research on 
the driving forces behind instability and extremism in East African and how to better integrate 
regional responses to them. Furthermore, the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) is another actor 
in Africa that has taken on the charge of producing and spreading knowledge. The Institute has 
collaborated with actors at the continental and regional level to organize trainings, summits and 
conferences. It has produced a plethora of research and policy-based information that has advised 
and guided measures taken on the continent in response to violent extremism and terrorism. The 
Institute has a significant role in the formation of CT strategies as it is one of the only African 
organisations with a seat at global counter-terrorism forums and has collaborated with 
governments through training to bolster their capacity to meet the threat of terrorism.126 
 It can, therefore, be argued that an epistemic community of like-minded actors has 
formed, through the adoption and promotion of research and policy orientated institutions. 
Moving on to the other hypothesis of this approach, namely that Scientific convergence about relations 
and responses to this issue is a necessary requirement for regime formation. It was argued above 
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that scientific responses to terrorism are few and far between. But while there may not be a degree 
of scientific convergence, there is a significant level of ‘knowledge convergence’. There is 
consensus within the research community described above about the importance of understanding 
the drivers and root causes of terrorism and therefore how to respond to it. As such, this 
convergence, while not scientific, is nevertheless significant in this context as it shapes the views 
of the epistemic community also present. 
This approach considered the direct role of shared knowledge and values in regime 
formation. It can be argued that the research and policy orientated activities present, constitute an 
epistemic community, that is a network of individuals that create a shared understanding of the 
issue of terrorism. This network functions as a conduit for integration, through the promotion of 
common views and values that links actors and states in the region. Furthermore, the embrace of 
a norm of non-indifference within the East African region has highlighted the willingness to 
intervene when faced with issues that threaten regional security.  
 
5.2.4 The Context-based Argument  
Finally, the last factor-based argument considers contextual dynamics and how they influence and 
shape state preferences. The role of exogenous events, both national and international, are central 
here, as it is argued that they could promote regime formation by catalysing state interaction and 
regional integration. Many of these external events have already been highlighted in the previous 
sections, but further elucidation can help is gauging their effect on the formation of a CT 
framework in East Africa.  
 The formation of today's CT framework in East Africa has gone through several phases, 
but major policy changes have tended to come off the back of major international and regional 
events. The 1998 embassy bombings in Nairobi and Kampala is a significant starting point that 
began discussions about the nature of the terrorist threat in Africa and the strategies needed to 
deal with it. The attacks highlighted several important points. Firstly, it underscored the dangers 
and reach of extremist groups in the region and the toll they were able to exert if left unchecked. 
Secondly, it highlighted to the internal community and especially the US, that their national security 
interests could be threatened even beyond their borders. Thirdly and finally, the attacks highlighted 
the glaring inadequacies in, at that time, the OAU’s capabilities in addressing and dealing 
transnational threats like terrorism. As such, the drafting of the Algiers Convention in 1999 aimed 
to address these specific issues. While this document was built on, supplemented and amended 
only a few years after it was drafted, it was still one of the first strategies adopted to meet the 
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terrorist threat and has functioned as a framework for ensuing treaties and conventions that were 
subsequently drafted.  
The next important event that has shaped security discourses in Africa was the September 
11 terrorist attacks. The 9/11 terrorist attacks and subsequent GWOT has been used by the US as 
a pretext to wage a ‘global war’, far outside the borders of the American homeland. The Africa 
continent since 9/11 has become an increasingly important arena in the fight against transnational 
terrorist threats, with East Africa holding especially significant geopolitical value. The US, which has 
dominated global discourses on the issue of terrorism, has long framed areas in East Africa as 
‘ungovernable’ and ‘fragile’ which could function as incubators for terrorist groups. As such, interest 
in bolstering CT capabilities in the region has grown exponentially and has become a vital pillar of US 
security policy. This same trend has also seen the formation of an extensive CT framework that we see 
today in East Africa. Due to the transnational nature of terrorism and the East African regions, 
geopolitical significance within the GWOT, countering terrorism and violent extremism has become a 
central goal in both the EAC and IGAD.  
Moving on, more recent attacks have also influenced policy formation and cooperation in 
the region. in Kenya/Uganda. The 2010 bombing at the Kampala Rugby Club and the Westgate 
terrorist attacks in Kenya in 2013, once again highlighted inadequacies in states response to such 
attacks. As such, several joint exercises, such as the EAJO, have been introduced with the aim of 
bolstering the capabilities of law enforcement officers from East Africa, to meet and address 
terrorist attacks. What the above has highlighted is the impact exogenous events have had on the 
formation of a comprehensive CT framework in East Africa. These events have stimulated the 
emergence of a political will needed to deal with a specific issue, in this case, terrorism. As such, it 
can be argued that in the absence of these events, the degree of cooperation and collaboration 
witnessed today in East Africa with regard to the issue of terrorism could have been considerably 
lower.   
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6. Conclusion & Discussion 
Global understandings of security issues and how they best can be addressed is a multifaceted task 
that requires close readings of the dynamics that shape them in the first place. Processes like 
globalization have blurred the lines between national and international demarcations and as such 
security threats that were once restricted by territorial borders have evolved to possess a 
transnational reach. This has been especially relevant to the African continent, which has seen 
many changes in the past decade. The AU has established itself as a security actor, with issues like 
counter-terrorism, no longer solely dictated by external forces. This security framework that has 
been developed by the AU has adopted a unique approach that has increasingly subscribed to the 
principle of regional subsidiarity. As such RECs have evolved as tangible agents that are able to 
realize overall peace and security goals on the continent. It is from this position that this study has 
evolved, with the central goal of understanding how far and why regional cooperation to address 
the issue of terrorism has taken hold in East Africa.  
 In order to achieve this, a regime theoretical perspective was employed that incorporated 
neorealist, neoliberalist and cognitivist approaches that provided explanations to how and why 
regimes form. As such, to answer the central question of this thesis, namely how far has a security 
regime formed in East Africa in response to the regions terrorist threat, two analytical models were applied. 
Firstly, a framework (Figure 3) that tracks the three stages of regime formation (Agenda setting, 
Institutional Bargaining and Operationalisation) was employed, which was then supplemented by 
a multivariant model (Figure 2) based on power, interest, knowledge and context-based 
assumptions. Each factor-based approach provided interesting insights into the degree of regime 
formation and also highlighted the dynamics that have led to institutional arrangements and 
cooperation within the East African region. Furthermore, the four social factors provide insights 
into the dynamics that shape the three stages of regime formation 
Beginning with the power-based approach, hegemonic dynamics have had a significant 
role in security cooperation in the region. On the one hand, the US has exercised considerable 
influence as a benign hegemon, in facilitating and financing capacity building strategies aimed at 
strengthening the regions CT framework. This dynamic has been especially influential on the 
agenda-setting phase of regime formation, as it is clear that the issue of terrorism holds a central 
place on both the international and African agenda and has become an issue that has necessitated 
a concerted response. On the other hand, the lack of a clear hegemonic power in the region has 
led to a discord between Kenya and Ethiopia, with both states vying for the dominant position. 
As such, a fully integrated regional response in the form of a security regime is somewhat 
hampered, as both countries have tended to exert their influence in their respective RECs. Here 
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the issues that have hampered the operationalization phase of regime theory are especially relevant, 
as the lack of political will to operationalize certain strategies may be borne out this conflict. In 
light of this, it could be interesting to consider the sub-regional formations, in the form of IGAD 
and the EAC alone, as the necessary conduits for effective cooperation and as such regime 
formation. 
Moving on to the interest-based factor, I argue that one of the most important factors 
associated with the formation of a comprehensive CT framework has been the high level of 
integrative bargaining that has preceded institutional arrangements. The inclusive nature of the 
summit meetings where these frameworks have been drafted indicates that CT cooperation in East 
Africa is very much a negotiated process. This has inevitably affected the institutional bargaining 
phase of regime formation, as has been highlighted by the plethora of policies, strategies and 
treaties that have been drafted in response to the terrorist threat. Furthermore, member states in 
East Africa have been driven by the consensual pursuit of collective security. As such, security 
interests in the region have very much aligned, which has facilitated cooperation between the 
member states.  
The role of knowledge and norms has also proven important in the formation of a CT 
framework. Central here has been the adoption by member states of the norm of non-indifference, 
which has made collective action more viable and has proven to be an important principle in 
maintaining peace and stability in the region. Furthermore, the presence of an epistemic 
community has also been noted which has also facilitated cooperation. The promotion and spread 
of knowledge has been important in the framing of the terrorist threat during the agenda-setting 
phase but it has also shaped the policies and strategies adopted in the institutional bargaining phase, 
as well as the mechanisms, developed to implement them in the operationalization stage of regime 
formation. Finally, the context-based approach has not only proved influential at all three stages 
of regime formation, but it has highlighted the unique contextual dynamics that has bolstered the 
formation of institutional arrangements in the region. As has been stated previously, I argue that 
in the absence of these events, the issue of terrorism would not have gained the political agency 
needed during the agenda-setting phase, nor would it have been addressed in the institutional 
bargaining and operationalization stages of regime formation. 
The multivariant model that has been applied in this thesis has highlighted the significant 
effects of power, interest, knowledge and context-based approaches to interstate cooperation and 
regime formation. The power dynamics have highlighted both how cooperation has been 
facilitated but also how it can hinder the full regional integration in East Africa. The interest-based 
assumptions have nevertheless underscored the consensual pursuit of collective security and how 
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it has established cooperation and collaboration as central strategies in realizing security goals. The 
spread of knowledge has proven useful in understanding the normative shifts that have governed 
contemporary security policies and how the promotion of knowledge through research and 
epistemic communities has established mechanisms needed to implement and monitor CT 
strategies. The East African context is complex and therefore necessitates a multidimensional 
approach. As such, I venture to say that fully understanding the dynamics that have led to this 
cooperation, requires the application of the multivariate model, as applying a single factor analysis, 
would be inadequate in realizing this papers goal.  
At its most basic, this thesis has strived to contribute to the existing literature within IR 
that focuses on understanding inter-state cooperation and the driving forces that influence state 
behaviour. More specifically though, this study has aimed to build from, and contribute to, existing 
regime theoretical findings, by applying them to East Africa context. By studying these dynamics 
through a regime theoretical perspective, I argue that interesting insights can be gleaned about 
security cooperation in Africa and how continental security goals can be realized through RECs. 
If we were to revert to the definition used for a regime, namely “implicit or explicit principles, 
norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a 
given area of international relations”. From the analysis and subsequent discussion, it can be 
established that many of these characteristics have been fulfilled within the CT framework present 
in East Africa. However, I concluded that a fully-fledged and effective security regime is not 
currently formed, but this may not hold true for much longer. As stated above, sub-regional 
cooperation within the EAC and IGAD may prove more effective in dealing with the terrorist 
threat. An effective institutional framework exists, a myriad of vital resources have been harnessed 
and security interests align between member states in the region. As such, more effective 
implementation procedures and better control mechanism remain the final hurdles to overcomes. 
Nevertheless, the capacity deficits and lack of resources that has halted full operationalization of 
CT strategies is an issue that the AU is currently focussed on remedying. The AU has already 
introduced a 0.2% levy on imports which will help towards financing central institutions within 
the organization; including the Peace Fund which oversees the implementation of peace and 
security goals. Similarly, EU, UN and US security interests in the continent are not going to 
diminish anytime soon, and through external financing (itself a noted aspect of fulfilling the goals 
of APSA) the issues currently hindering the formation of an effective regime may be rectified.  
The regime theoretical approach used in this thesis, which has predominantly been applied 
to environmental contexts, can only be strengthened by its application and use within security 
orientated cooperation. As such, further research should aim to utilize this approach to understand 
 
48 
institutional arrangements in other regions and contexts, as it has proven useful in unpacking the 
dynamics and processes that lead to security cooperation.  Furthermore, an aspect that is missing 
from this thesis is the micro-level perspective, that fully considers the individuals that are part of 
the process of institution building. Further research will benefit significantly by unpacking the 
bureaucratic culture within the AU as well as IGAD and the EAC, to better understand the day to 
day routines and culture that may influence decision-making processes. This can best be achieved 
through interviews with key players within the relevant institutions. All in all, this thesis has aimed 
to provide a framework for analysing regional cooperation within a specific security issue. Further 
research should consider whether this can be replicated with a focus on other threats, such as 
piracy or organized crime in Africa. Furthermore, a very interesting avenue that can be pursued 
would see this framework applied to other RECs in Africa. This could not only provide interesting 
insights into the dynamics that govern cooperation in other regions but also highlight the necessary 
conditions needed for the overall realization of the goals and vision of the AUs security 
architecture.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
49 
7. Bibliography  
African Union, About Agenda 2063, https://au.int/agenda2063/about, (accessed May 14). 
African Union, The African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT), 
http://www.peaceau.org/en/page/2-3591-static-about-african-centre-for-study-and-
research-on-terrorism-ACSRT, (accessed 4 April). 
African Union (2011), The African Model Anti-Terrorism  
African Union, African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), http://amisom-au.org/amisom-
background/, (accessed May 8). 
African Union (2014), Agenda 2063; The Africa We Want; African Union Commission,  
African Union (2004), Declaration of the 2nd High Level Intergovernmental Meeting on the Prevention and 
Combating of Terrorism in Africa; Algeria. 
African Union (2002), Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African 
Union;  
African Union, Regional Economic Communities (RECs), https://au.int/en/organs/recs, (accessed 26 
March ). 
African Union (2014), Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on Terrorism and Violent Extremism in 
Africa; Peace and Security Council,  
African Union (2004), Solemn Declaration on a Common African Defence and Security Policy;  
Aning, Kwesi, and Naila  Salihu, 'The African Security Predicament', in J.J. Hentz (ed.), Routledge 
Handbook of African Security, London, Routledge, 2013, pp. 9-20. 
Arthur, Peter, 'Promoting Security in Africa through Regional Economic Communities (RECs) 
and the African Union’s African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)', Insight on Africa, 
vol. 9, no. 1, 2017, pp. 1-21. 
Bach, Daniel. C, 'Regionalism in Africa', in J.J. Hentz (ed.), Routledge Handbook of African Security, 
London, Routlage, 2013, pp. 181-189. 
Blatter, J., and M. Haverland, Designing Case Studies: Explanatory Approaches in Small-N Research, 
Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2012. 
Breitmeier, Helmut, 'International Organizations and the Creation of Environmental Regimes', in 
O.R. Young (ed.), Global Governance: Drawing Insights fromthe Environmental Experience, 
Cambridge, MIT Press, 1997, pp. 87-114. 
Brosig, Malte, 'Introduction: The African Security Regime Complex—Exploring Converging 
Actors and Policies', African Security, vol. 6, no. 3-4, 2013, pp. 171-190. 
CGCC and ISSP, Fighting terrorism through justice: Implementing the IGAD Legal Framework for Cooperation 
against Terrorism, edited, New York and Addis Ababa, 2012. 
Cline, Lawrence E., 'African Regional Intelligence Cooperation: Problems and Prospects', 
International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, vol. 29, no. 3, 2016, pp. 447-469. 
D. Williams, Paul, 'From Non-Intervention to Non-Indifference: The Origins and Development 
of the African Union's Security Culture', vol. 106, no. 423, 2007, pp. 253-279. 
Deng, Francis 'Reconciling sovereignty with responsibility', in John W. Harbeson and Donald S. 
Rothchild (eds), African in World Politics Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 2013, pp. 310-349. 
Department of Defence (August 1995), U.S. Security Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa; Washington DC. 
EAC, Overview of Peace and Security Strategy, https://www.eac.int/security, (accessed 7 May). 
EAC, Protocol on Cooperation in Defence Affairs, 
https://www.eac.int/rmo/index.php?option=com_content&id=154%3Aregional-
integration-support-programme-risp&Itemid=1, (accessed 7 April). 
EAC (November 2013), Protocol on Peace and Security  
EAC, 'Regional Strategy for Peace and Security (adopted by the 13th EAC Council of Ministers 
meeting, Arusha, Tanzania).', 2006. 
EAC (1999), The Treaty for the Establishment of the East Africa Community;  
East African Region (2014), Agreement on the Establishment of the East African Standby Force (EASF);  
 
50 
Elowson, Camilla, and Adriana Lins de Albuquerque, 'Challenges to Peace and Security in Eastern 
Africa: The role of IGAD, EAC and EASF ', Swedish Research Agency, 2016. 
Engel, Ulf, and João Gomes Porto, 'The African Union's New Peace and Security Architecture: 
Toward an Evolving Security Regime?', African Security, vol. 2, no. 2-3, 2009, pp. 82-96. 
Ewi, Martin, 'The role of regional organizations in promoting cooperation on counter-terrorism 
matters', in L. van den Herik and N. Schrijver (eds), Counter-Terrorism Strategies in a 
Fragmented International Legal Order: Meeting the Challenges, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 2013, pp. 128-180. 
Haas, Peter M., 'Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean Pollution 
Control', International Organization, vol. 43, no. 3, 1989, pp. 377-403. 
Haas, Peter M., 'Epistemic Communites and Regimes', in V. Rittberger and P. Mayer (eds), Regime 
theory and international relations, Clarendon Press, 1993, pp. 168-201. 
Haggard, Stephan, and Beth A. Simmons, 'Theories of international regimes', International 
Organization, vol. 41, no. 3, 2009, pp. 491-517. Available from: Cambridge Core. 
Hasenclever, A., P. Mayer, and V. Rittberger, (eds), Theories of International Regimes, Cambridge 
University Press, 1997. 
Hentz, James. J., 'Introduction: African security in the twenty-first century ', in J.J. Hentz (ed.), 
Routledge Handbook of African Security, London, Routledge, 2013, pp. 3-8. 
House, White (2002), The National Security Strategy of the United States of America White House, 
Washington, DC, . 
Howell, J., and J. Lind, Counter-Terrorism, Aid and Civil Society: Before and After the War on Terror, 
Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2009. 
IGAD (1996), Agreement Establishing the Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD);  
IGAD, Capacity Building Program against Terrorism (ICPAT), http://www.igadregion.org/icpat/, 
(accessed 6 April). 
IGAD, Centre of Excellence in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (ICEPCVE), 
http://www.icepcve.org/mission.html, (accessed 6 April). 
IGAD, Security Sector Program (ISSP) https://igadssp.org/, (accessed 6 April). 
Keohane, Robert O., After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, Princeton 
University Press, 1984. 
Keohane, Robert O., ''The Analysis of International Regimes: Towards a European American 
Research Programme'', in V. Rittberger and P. Mayer (eds), Regime theory and international 
relations, Clarendon Press, 1993, pp. 23-45. 
Krasner, Stephen D., 'Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening 
Variables', International Organization, vol. 36, no. 2, 1982, pp. 185-205. 
Levy, M., O. Young, and M. Zürn, 'The Study of International Regimes', European Journal of 
International Relations, vol. 1, no. 3, 1995, pp. 267-330. 
Little, Richard, 'International regimes', in John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens (eds), The 
globalization of world politics: an introduction to international relations, 5th ed edn, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2014, pp. 289-303. 
Meyer, Angela, 'Regional Intergration and Security in Central Africa-Assessment and Perspectives 
10 Years After the Revival', Egmont Papers, no. 25, 2008. 
Nations, United (1998), Security Council Strongly Condemns Terrorist Bomb Attacks in Nairobi and Dar es 
Salaam, Press Release SC/6559  
OAU (1963), Charter of the Organization of African Unity  
OAU (2000), Constitutive Act of the African Union;  
OAU (1999), Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism  
OAU (1994), Declaration on the Code of Conduct for Inter-African Relations, AHG/Del.2 (XXX);  
OAU (1992), Resolution on the Strengthening of Cooperation and Coordination among African States, 
AHG/Res. 213 (XXVIII);  
 
51 
Osherenko, G., and O.R. Young, 'The Formation of International Regimes', in O.R. Young and 
G. Osherenko (eds), Polar Politics: Creating International Environmental Regimes, Cornell 
University Press, 1993, pp. 1-21. 
Pham, Peter, J, 'Terrorism and Counterterrorismin Africa ', in J.J. Hentz (ed.), Routledge Handbook 
of African Security, London, Routlage, 2013, pp. 43-55. 
Porto, J.G., P.D.U. Engel, and P.N.K. Poku, (eds), Towards an African Peace and Security Regime: 
Continental Embeddedness, Transnational Linkages, Strategic Relevance, Ashgate Publishing 
Limited, 2013. 
Program, International Information, U.S. Embassy Bombings, http://archive.li/ccAvu, (accessed 10 
April). 
Publication, United States Department of State (2005), Country Reports on Terrorism 2005; Office of 
the Coordinator for Counterterrorism,  
Rechner, Jonathan D., 'From the OAU to the AU: A Normative Shift with Implications for 
Peacekeeping and Conflict Management, or Just a Name Change?', Vanderbilt Journal of 
Transnational Law, vol. 39, no. 2, 2006, pp. 543-576. 
Rice, Susan, E. (2001), Testimony before the Subcommittee on Africa of the International Relations Committee,; 
United States House of Representative, Washington. 
Rittberger, V., and P. Mayer, (eds), Regime theory and international relations, Clarendon Press, 1993. 
Rittberger, Volker., ''Research on International Regimes in Germany'', in V. Rittberger and P. 
Mayer (eds), Regime theory and international relations, Clarendon Press, 1993, pp. 3-22. 
Roberts, George, 'The Uganda–Tanzania War, the fall of Idi Amin, and the failure of African 
diplomacy, 1978–1979', Journal of Eastern African Studies, vol. 8, no. 4, 2014, pp. 692-709. 
Ruggie, John Gerard, 'International responses to technology: Concepts and trends', International 
Organization, vol. 29, no. 3, 1975, pp. 557-583. Available from: Cambridge Core. 
Shinn, David H., 'Terrorism in East Africa and the Horn: An Overview', Journal of Conflict Studies,, 
vol. 23, no. 2, 2006. 
State, United States Department of (2016), Antiterrorism Assistance Report; Office of Antiterrorism 
Assistance,  
Strange, Susan, 'Cave! hic dragones: a critique of regime analysis', International Organization vol. 36, 
no. 2, 1982, pp. 479-496. Available from: Cambridge Core. 
Studies, Institute fo Security, How We Work, https://issafrica.org/about-us/how-we-work, 
(accessed May 8). 
Studies, Institute for Security, 26th AU Summit: Why isn't the AU's counter-terrorism strategy working?, 
https://issafrica.org/pscreport/on-the-agenda/26th-au-summit-why-isnt-the-aus-
counter-terrorism-strategy-working, (accessed 11 April ). 
Toshkov, Dimiter, 'Research Design ', in V. Lowndes, J.G. March and G. Stoker (eds), Theory and 
Methods in Poltical Science, Macmillan Education UK, 2017, pp. 219-236. 
Union, African (2002), Plan of Action of The African Union High-Level Inter-Governmental Meeting on The 
Prevention and Combating of Terrorism in Africa; Algeria. 
Union, African (2013), Strategic Plan 2014-2017 African Union Commission,  
United States African Command, Combined Joint Task Force– Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), 
http://www.hoa.africom.mil/about, (accessed 20 April). 
United States Department of State, Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (PREACT), 
https://www.state.gov/j/ct/programs/index.htm#PREACT, (accessed 20 April). 
Welz, Martin, 'From Non-interference towards Non-indifference: An Ongoing Paradigm Shift 
within the African Union?', in J.G. Porto and P. Engel (eds), Towards an African Peace and 
Security Regime: Continental Embeddedness, Transnational Linkages, Strategic Relevance, Ashgate 
Publishing Limited, 2013, pp. 31-51. 
White House (2006), The National Security Strategy of the United States of America White House, 
Washington DC. 
White House (2010), The National Security Strategy of the United States of America Washington DC. 
 
52 
Young, Crawford, 'The Heritage of Colonialism ', in John W. Harbeson and Donald S. Rothchild 
(eds), Africa in world politics: engaging a changing global order, Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 
2013, pp. 15-34. 
Young, O.R., and G. Osherenko, 'International Regime Formation:Findings, Research Priorities 
and Applications ', in O.R. Young and G. Osherenko (eds), Polar Politics: Creating 
International Environmental Regimes, Cornell University Press, 1993, pp. 223-261. 
Young, Oran .R., and Gail. Osherenko, (eds), Polar Politics: Creating International Environmental 
Regimes, Cornell University Press, 1993. 
Young, Oran R., and Gail Osherenko, 'Testing Theories of Regime Formation: Findings from a 
Large Collaborative Research Project', in V. Rittberger and P. Mayer (eds), Regime theory and 
international relations, Clarendon Press, 1993, pp. 223-251. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
53 
Appendix  
The framework is borrowed from Young and Osherenko 1993: 263-266. 
A. Power-based hypotheses  
Basic Premise: Institutions, including international regimes, are structured by and reflect the 
distribution and configuration of power in international society.  
1. Hegemony. The most widely discussed hypothesis in this set, which arises from 
hegemonic stability theory, states that the presence of a hegemon (that is, an actor possessing a 
preponderance of material resources) is a necessary condition for regime formation in international 
society. a. Benign hegemony: the hegemon, functioning as the dominant member of a privileged 
group, supplies institutional arrangements to others as public goods. b. Coercive hegemony: the 
hegemon exercises structural power to impose institutional arrangements favourable to itself, 
regardless of the consequences for others.  
2. Other power-based hypotheses are possible. Here are some examples to consider. 
a. A bipolar or bimodal distribution of power (producing a balance of power) is necessary for 
success in regime formation. b. The greater the degree of symmetry in the distribution of power, 
the more likely efforts to create regimes are to succeed. c. The existence of a small group of great 
powers in a given issue area (that is, a directorate) enhances prospects for regime formation.  
 
B. Interest-based hypotheses  
Basic Premise: Social institutions, including international regimes arise from the interaction of self-
interested parties endeavouring to coordinate their behaviour to reap joint gains that may but need 
not take the form of public goods. It follows that the availability of joint gains or, in other words, 
a contract zone or zone of agreements constitutes a necessary (though not sufficient) condition 
for the formation of international regimes. There is, however, no need to assume that the parties 
possess full or complete information regarding the extent or precise nature of the feasible or joint 
gains at the outset. (In some situations, parties dispute or disagree regarding the existence or scope 
of joint gains.) Efforts to construct theories about the resilient interactions address the following 
question: Why do actors in international society succeed in forming international regimes to reap 
feasible gains in some cases but not in others? The processes leading to success or failure are 
ordinarily conceptualized as bargaining or negotiation; the hypotheses of interest to us identify 
determinants of success or failure in the resultant institutional bargaining.  
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1. Integrative bargaining and a veil of uncertainty. Institutional bargaining can succeed only 
when the prominence of integrative bargaining and/or the presence of a veil of uncertainty make 
it easy for the partners to approach the problem under consideration in contractarian terms.  
2. Equity. The availability of institutional options that all participants can accept as equitable 
(rather than efficient) is necessary for institutional bargaining to succeed.  
3. Salient solutions. The existence of a salient solution (or focal point describable in simple terms) 
increases the probability of success in institutional bargaining.  
4. Exogenous shocks or crises. Shocks or crises occurring outside of the bargaining process 
increase the probability of success in efforts to negotiate the terms of international regimes.  
5. Policy priority. (a) Success in regime formation can occur only when the issue at stake achieves 
high-priority status on the policy agenda of each of the participants. (b) Alternatively, it is easier to 
from a regime when the subject matter is not high on the political agendas of the parties.  
6. Common good. A willingness to set aside narrow national interests in favor of some broader 
conception of the common good is necessary to achieve success in regime formation.  
7. Science and technology. (a) The greater the tendency for parties to concentrate on scientific 
or technical considerations as opposed to political issues, the greater the likelihood of successful 
regime formation. (b) The greater the role of negotiators with scientific or technical competence 
in relation to those with political credentials, the greater the likelihood for successful regime 
formation. (c) It is easier to form a regime when the issues at state are highly technical.  
8. Relevant parties. All parties with an interest in the problem must participate in the negations 
for regime formation to succeed.  
9. Compliance mechanisms. The probability for success in institutional bargaining rises when 
compliance mechanisms that the parties regard as clear-cut and effective are available.  
10. Individuals as leaders. Institutional bargaining is likely to succeed when individual leadership 
emerges; it will fail in the absence of such leadership.   
C. Knowledge-based hypotheses  
Basic Premise: Shared perceptions, beliefs, and understandings of causal mechanisms among the 
relevant parties as well as identifiable communities, including epistemic communities and advocacy 
organizations, that arise to propagate this knowledge are important determinants of regime 
formation. Some would argue that cognitive considerations - including ideas, values and learning 
shared through transnational alliances, nongovernmental organizations, and groups of experts - 
constitute a more significant factor in regime formation than power or the interests of states. Two 
alternative accounts of how cognitive concerns influence regime formation are identifiable in the 
literature.  
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1. Scientific convergence. Agreement or consensus within the scientific community regarding 
causal relations and appropriate responses is a prerequisite for regime formation. (Values are less 
important, though not irrelevant, to this hypotheses than to the next hypothesis. 
2. Epistemic communities. A group of individuals (whose membership usually transcends 
national boundaries and includes both scientists or experts and policy makers) who share a 
common view regarding causal mechanisms and appropriate responses and who have a common 
set of values emerges in conjunction with the issue in question. For a regime to form some 
mechanism (possibly an international organization but in some cases a less formal network) arises 
to link the members of this group. The resulting epistemic community is able not only to promote 
its own preferred arrangements but also prevent opposing views and values from becoming 
influential or dominant at the domestic level in each of the relevant states.  
D. Contextual factors National and world circumstances and events seemingly 
unrelated to the issue area under consideration play a major role in determining if and when 
international cooperation to address a particular problem or issue area occurs and in shaping the 
content of any regime that forms. 
 
